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Abstract	  When	  does	  composition	  occur?	  There	  are	  historical	  accounts	  that	  claim	  there	  are	  no	  composite	  objects,	  or	  that	  composite	  objects	  can	  consist	  of	  any	  given	  objects.	  These	  views	  fail	  to	  preserve	  our	  intuitions	  and	  warrant	  a	  different	  understanding	  of	  the	  term	  “object”.	  I	  present	  a	  psychological	  approach	  wherein	  observers	  ascribe	  objecthood	  to	  an	  arrangement	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  secondary	  quality.	  This	  subjective	  behavior	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  development	  of	  our	  perceptual	  capacities	  in	  our	  natural	  history.	  	  
	  
	  
Chapter	  1-­‐	  Composition	  and	  Competing	  Claims:	  
	  
1.1-­‐	  Introduction	  to	  Composition:	  As	  our	  understanding	  of	  composition	  has	  grown,	  the	  sensible	  world	  has	  revealed	  itself	  to	  be	  the	  sum	  of	  numerous	  microscopic	  particles.	  Our	  scientific	  inquiries	  have	  led	  us	  to	  see	  the	  world	  around	  us	  in	  terms	  of	  increasingly	  smaller	  pieces	  as	  we	  continue	  our	  search	  for	  the	  most	  fundamental	  parts.	  When	  guided	  by	  our	  intuition	  alone,	  we	  all	  feel	  compelled	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  exist	  ordinary	  objects	  such	  as	  tables	  and	  chairs.	  Yet	  how	  are	  we	  to	  reconcile	  these	  intuitions	  with	  our	  evidence	  of	  the	  particles	  underlying	  supposed	  composite	  objects?	  We	  know	  that	  there	  are	  particles	  making	  up	  what	  we	  call	  a	  “table”.	  But	  does	  a	  table	  have	  any	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ontological	  value,	  or	  is	  it	  merely	  an	  arbitrary	  label	  we’ve	  applied	  to	  those	  particles?	  Despite	  our	  uncertainties	  regarding	  objecthood	  in	  this	  fragmented	  environment,	  we	  remain	  drawn	  to	  our	  intuitions	  that	  composite	  objects	  exist.	  Why	  do	  we	  have	  such	  intuitions,	  and	  how	  do	  they	  shape	  the	  way	  we	  look	  at	  the	  world?	  In	  this	  thesis	  I	  present	  my	  own	  view	  on	  composite	  objects	  that	  looks	  to	  preserve	  these	  intuitions	  by	  taking	  an	  approach	  that	  integrates	  a	  psychological	  framework.	  Through	  an	  account	  of	  the	  evolutionary	  history	  of	  our	  perceptions	  tendencies,	  I	  hope	  to	  make	  clear	  the	  grand	  importance	  of	  psychological	  processes	  in	  influencing	  our	  recognition	  of	  objects.	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  first	  chapter	  will	  be	  to	  provide	  context	  to	  my	  view	  through	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  special	  composition	  question	  and	  its	  historical	  approaches.	  Perhaps	  the	  best	  place	  to	  begin	  is	  with	  the	  philosophical	  issue	  to	  be	  discussed.	  The	  fundamental	  question	  that	  we	  seek	  to	  answer	  is	  “When	  do	  some	  number	  of	  x’s	  compose	  a	  y?”	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  when	  (if	  ever)	  should	  we	  consider	  something	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of	  a	  greater	  whole?	  This	  line	  of	  inquiry	  has	  come	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  special	  composition	  question	  (van	  Inwagen	  21).	  This	  question	  is	  fundamental	  to	  most	  discussions	  of	  mereology,	  the	  theory	  of	  part-­‐whole	  relationships.	  	  When	  we	  look	  to	  answer	  this	  question	  of	  composition,	  we	  may	  often	  make	  reference	  to	  “simples”.	  In	  theory,	  there	  may	  exist	  these	  mereological	  simples	  that	  are	  the	  most	  fundamental	  particles	  possible.	  Because	  they	  have	  no	  proper	  parts,	  they	  serve	  as	  an	  important	  theoretical	  tool	  for	  our	  discussion.	  Should	  we	  choose	  to	  work	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  simples	  do	  in	  fact	  exist,	  we	  must	  imagine	  that	  everything	  around	  us	  is	  made	  up	  of	  them	  at	  some	  level.	  Of	  course,	  not	  everyone	  is	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committed	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  these	  simples;	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  our	  discussion	  outside	  of	  nihilism,	  it	  should	  be	  satisfactory	  to	  make	  reference	  to	  objects	  or	  x’s	  instead.	  With	  some	  number	  of	  x’s	  underlying	  all	  of	  creation,	  we	  can	  start	  to	  imagine	  the	  issue	  that	  is	  at	  hand;	  how	  should	  we	  think	  of	  these	  things	  we	  interact	  with	  every	  day,	  such	  as	  tables	  and	  chairs,	  given	  that	  there	  is	  a	  truer	  understanding	  of	  their	  nature	  hidden	  beneath	  the	  surface?	  This	  is	  precisely	  the	  sort	  of	  problem	  that	  arises	  when	  we	  deal	  with	  the	  special	  composition	  question.	  	  	  
1.2-­‐	  Three	  Schools	  of	  Thought:	  Fortunately,	  there	  has	  been	  no	  shortage	  of	  discussion	  on	  composition.	  Although	  there	  have	  been	  many	  different	  answers	  to	  this	  question	  in	  the	  past,	  these	  answers	  can	  generally	  be	  broken	  down	  into	  a	  few	  broader	  schools	  of	  thought:	  nihilism	  and	  universalism	  are	  the	  extreme	  views,	  followed	  by	  the	  many	  moderate	  views	  in	  between.	  Each	  has	  their	  own	  approach	  to	  the	  existence	  or	  non-­‐existence	  of	  objects.	  	   The	  first	  of	  these	  approaches	  is	  mereological	  nihilism.	  Nihilists	  claim	  that	  composition	  never	  occurs.	  There	  are	  no	  objects	  other	  than	  simples,	  the	  most	  fundamental	  material	  units	  of	  the	  universe.	  Where	  your	  average	  non-­‐philosopher	  would	  see	  a	  chair	  or	  a	  table,	  a	  nihilist	  would	  see	  only	  some	  arrangement	  of	  partless	  simples.	  Furthermore,	  these	  nihilists	  argue	  that	  the	  average	  person	  is	  constantly	  making	  errors	  when	  they	  identify	  objects.	  This	  means	  that	  there	  are	  no	  tables,	  chairs,	  or	  other	  composite	  objects,	  even	  if	  we	  might	  think	  that	  there	  are.	  Our	  intuitions	  are	  not	  to	  be	  trusted,	  because	  they	  will	  often	  deceive	  us	  into	  seeing	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arrangements	  of	  simples	  as	  objects,	  rather	  than	  the	  truer	  underlying	  simples.	  	  A	  bit	  of	  clarification	  with	  the	  nihilist	  approach	  is	  actually	  quite	  important	  to	  my	  own	  view.	  If	  a	  nihilist	  says	  “there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  a	  chair”,	  they	  do	  not	  mean	  to	  say	  that	  we	  are	  hallucinating	  whenever	  we	  take	  a	  seat.	  They	  would	  not	  argue	  that	  the	  thing	  we	  call	  a	  chair	  is	  insubstantial.	  In	  fact,	  the	  nihilist	  is	  quite	  adamant	  that	  there	  is	  an	  underlying	  structure	  present	  in	  this	  observed	  stimulus.	  The	  point	  that	  these	  mereological	  nihilists	  want	  to	  get	  across	  is	  that	  this	  supposed	  “chair”	  is	  nothing	  more	  than	  an	  arrangement	  of	  simples.	  There	  simply	  isn’t	  any	  reason	  to	  think	  of	  these	  simples	  as	  parts	  of	  a	  whole	  that	  belong	  together.	  Perhaps	  this	  is	  reasonable	  to	  an	  extent;	  certainly	  there	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  anything	  inherently	  special	  about	  “simples	  arranged	  chair-­‐wise”.	  At	  a	  glance,	  these	  arrangements	  lack	  the	  metaphysical	  glue	  they	  need	  to	  be	  innately	  related	  to	  one	  another	  as	  parts.	  As	  I	  will	  discuss	  at	  length	  in	  Chapters	  3	  and	  4,	  this	  metaphysical	  glue	  is	  found	  not	  in	  the	  arrangement	  itself,	  but	  in	  the	  observer.	  Observers	  are	  vital	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  composite	  objects,	  because	  they	  are	  the	  only	  things	  capable	  of	  exerting	  any	  perceptual	  or	  interpretive	  forces	  on	  the	  world.	  The	  universe	  is	  a	  chaotic	  flurry	  of	  simples,	  and	  it	  is	  only	  because	  observers	  prioritize	  certain	  patterns	  of	  these	  simples	  that	  there	  is	  any	  need	  to	  reference	  simples	  together.	  	  One	  major	  advantage	  to	  nihilism	  is	  its	  ideological	  simplicity.	  Nihilists	  do	  not	  need	  to	  posit	  circumstances	  or	  conditions	  that	  allow	  for	  composition,	  because	  they	  deny	  that	  composition	  ever	  occurs.	  This	  exemption	  results	  in	  a	  mereological	  account	  that	  is	  relatively	  easy	  to	  comprehend.	  Furthermore,	  nihilism	  seems	  to	  reflect	  the	  discoveries	  physicists	  have	  made	  over	  the	  years;	  that	  there	  are	  miniscule	  particles	  
A	  PSYCHOLOGICAL	  APPROACH	  TO	  THE	  SPECIAL	  COMPOSITION	  QUESTION	  
	   7	  
underlying	  the	  material	  world	  around	  us.	  Nihilism	  is	  also	  capable	  of	  avoiding	  certain	  puzzles	  that	  can	  prove	  difficult	  for	  other	  views	  (generally	  moderate	  ones).	  Gabriele	  Contessa	  outlines	  a	  number	  of	  these	  puzzles	  that	  nihilists	  manage	  to	  successfully	  escape	  (2014,	  219).	  One	  such	  puzzle	  is	  that	  of	  “the	  Statue	  and	  the	  Clay”.	  	  If	  we	  were	  to	  take	  a	  lump	  of	  clay	  at	  time	  A,	  and	  mold	  it	  such	  that	  there	  is	  a	  statue	  at	  time	  B,	  has	  a	  new	  object	  come	  into	  existence	  from	  the	  same	  constituent	  matter?	  And	  does	  the	  lump	  of	  clay	  still	  exist,	  or	  has	  it	  been	  destroyed	  and	  replaced	  by	  the	  statue	  in	  some	  way?	  Nihilists	  can	  simply	  state	  that	  the	  “statue”	  is	  really	  just	  a	  rearrangement	  of	  the	  same	  miniscule	  objects	  that	  were	  previously	  arrange	  lump-­‐wise.	  Nothing	  has	  been	  created	  or	  destroyed;	  merely	  rearranged.	  “The	  Problem	  of	  the	  Many”	  is	  another	  such	  puzzle.	  There	  are	  instances	  we	  can	  think	  of	  wherein	  the	  boundaries	  of	  an	  object	  are	  somewhat	  vague,	  such	  as	  with	  clouds.	  A	  cloud	  consists	  of	  some	  arrangement	  of	  water	  droplets,	  but	  once	  you	  get	  away	  from	  the	  cloud’s	  core,	  it	  starts	  to	  become	  difficult	  to	  ascertain	  which	  water	  droplets	  count	  as	  being	  part	  of	  the	  cloud.	  When	  we	  consider	  the	  core	  of	  a	  cloud	  alongside	  any	  particular	  simples	  along	  this	  vague	  periphery,	  the	  result	  does	  still	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  cloud	  with	  all	  of	  the	  typical	  cloud-­‐like	  properties	  (i.e.	  gaseous,	  wet).	  But,	  if	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  there	  are	  actually	  a	  vast	  number	  of	  clouds	  consisting	  of	  the	  various	  possible	  combinations	  among	  the	  cloud’s	  core	  and	  peripheral	  simples.	  A	  single	  cloud	  would	  potentially	  coincide	  with	  thousands	  of	  smaller	  clouds,	  which	  is	  not	  something	  we	  generally	  find	  intuitive;	  how	  can	  so	  many	  objects	  exist	  in	  the	  same	  matter?	  Nihilists	  don’t	  have	  to	  deal	  with	  this	  problem	  at	  all,	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because	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  reference	  something	  like	  a	  “cloud”,	  only	  the	  simples	  in	  various	  arrangements.	  	  	   There	  is	  also	  the	  question	  of	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  individual	  simples	  are	  essential	  to	  an	  object.	  If	  we	  were	  to	  remove	  a	  single	  simple	  from	  an	  apple,	  would	  we	  still	  have	  an	  apple?	  Generally	  we	  are	  inclined	  to	  think	  that	  the	  apple	  remains.	  And	  the	  same	  is	  true	  if	  we	  remove	  a	  second	  simple;	  the	  change	  is	  practically	  unnoticeable,	  so	  surely	  the	  apple	  still	  exists.	  But	  if	  we	  continue	  removing	  simples	  in	  this	  same	  pattern,	  eventually	  we’d	  end	  up	  with	  something	  unlike	  an	  apple	  (perhaps	  just	  a	  small	  stem).	  At	  what	  point	  should	  we	  draw	  the	  line	  and	  say	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  apple	  has	  been	  disrupted?	  Again,	  this	  question	  is	  a	  non-­‐issue	  for	  nihilists,	  because	  there	  was	  never	  an	  apple	  to	  begin	  with.	  Despite	  its	  simplicity	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  sidestep	  common	  problems,	  there	  are	  still	  reasons	  to	  find	  mereological	  nihilism	  unattractive.	  The	  most	  immediate	  problem	  with	  nihilism	  is	  its	  elimination	  of	  “ordinary	  objects”	  from	  our	  ontology.	  Nihilists	  deny	  the	  existence	  of	  composite	  objects	  that	  we	  are	  quite	  familiar	  with,	  such	  as	  the	  usual	  tables	  and	  chairs.	  For	  many	  philosophers	  (myself	  included)	  this	  represents	  a	  breach	  of	  our	  intuitions	  that	  condemns	  any	  purely	  nihilist	  view.	  Such	  people	  would	  say	  that	  we	  have	  far	  more	  confidence	  in	  our	  intuitions	  about	  objects	  than	  we	  do	  in	  philosophical	  theories.	  However,	  not	  everyone	  is	  so	  convinced	  that	  these	  intuitions	  are	  worth	  preserving.	  John	  Tallant	  would	  refer	  to	  some	  such	  people	  as	  “extreme	  nihilists”,	  because	  they	  do	  not	  even	  see	  the	  need	  to	  refer	  to	  ordinary	  objects	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  arrangement.	  (Tallant	  1512).	  Against	  those	  willing	  to	  bite	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this	  bullet	  and	  give	  up	  on	  ordinary	  objects,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  other	  potential	  objections.	  One	  threat	  to	  nihilism	  comes	  from	  its	  reliance	  on	  simples.	  Nihilists	  paint	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  universe	  that	  has	  a	  smallest	  possible	  building	  block.	  These	  building	  blocks	  are	  generally	  thought	  of	  in	  terms	  of	  miniscule	  particles	  akin	  to	  atoms.	  But	  there	  is	  also	  that	  the	  possibility	  that	  there	  is	  no	  smallest	  particle,	  or	  that	  we	  shouldn’t	  even	  think	  of	  these	  building	  blocks	  in	  terms	  of	  particles.	  We	  can	  imagine	  the	  universe	  instead	  consisting	  of	  a	  sort	  of	  “gunk”	  that	  is	  infinitely	  divisible.	  Each	  of	  the	  gunk’s	  parts	  has	  further	  parts,	  and	  those	  parts	  have	  their	  own	  parts	  in	  turn,	  so	  on	  and	  so	  forth,	  infinitely.	  Nihilists	  want	  to	  say	  that	  nothing	  exists	  except	  the	  most	  fundamental,	  but	  it	  could	  potentially	  be	  the	  case	  that	  there	  is	  no	  end	  point	  in	  the	  search	  for	  simples,	  and	  that	  every	  object	  has	  proper	  parts	  (Sider	  31).	  Another	  objection	  that	  has	  been	  raised	  against	  nihilism	  comes	  from	  a	  Cartesian	  sort	  of	  approach.	  Descartes’	  famous	  Cogito	  argument	  posits	  that	  I	  can	  be	  sure	  of	  my	  own	  existence,	  because	  for	  me	  to	  even	  consider	  the	  matter	  would	  mean	  that	  there	  is	  something	  undertaking	  this	  consideration.	  This	  argument	  is	  widely	  accepted,	  with	  our	  own	  existence	  serving	  as	  one	  of	  the	  few	  certainties	  in	  the	  face	  of	  extreme	  skepticism.	  Given	  this	  argument,	  one	  challenge	  against	  nihilism	  is	  to	  say	  that	  I	  exist,	  and	  I	  am	  a	  composite	  object,	  therefore	  a	  composite	  object	  exists.	  As	  Ted	  Sider	  points	  out,	  this	  type	  of	  objection	  relies	  on	  the	  premise	  I	  am,	  in	  fact,	  a	  composite	  object.	  Perhaps	  such	  a	  view	  would	  then	  be	  more	  appealing	  to	  those	  with	  physicalist	  inclinations	  (Sider	  29).	  For	  my	  own	  part,	  I	  find	  these	  objections	  to	  be	  serious	  concerns	  for	  nihilism.	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This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  I	  entirely	  reject	  nihilism,	  however.	  In	  fact,	  as	  I	  will	  go	  on	  to	  describe	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  my	  own	  view	  closely	  resembles	  nihilism	  in	  some	  respects.	  Nihilists	  have	  the	  advantage	  of	  not	  requiring	  some	  fabled	  “ontological	  list”	  of	  the	  objects	  that	  actually	  exist	  (unless,	  of	  course,	  that	  list	  is	  limited	  to	  simples	  alone).	  Arrangements	  of	  simples	  can	  be	  said	  to	  exist,	  but	  those	  arrangements	  lack	  any	  ontological	  value	  in	  their	  own	  right;	  that	  value	  is	  instead	  reducible	  to	  that	  of	  the	  fundamental	  parts	  within	  the	  arrangement.	  	  	   On	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  is	  the	  mereological	  universalist.	  Universalists	  claim	  that	  any	  collection	  of	  x’s	  composes	  an	  object.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  this	  view	  allows	  for	  the	  preservation	  of	  some	  of	  our	  intuitions.	  Universalists,	  for	  example,	  can	  allow	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  composite	  object	  called	  a	  chair,	  or	  an	  apple,	  without	  needing	  to	  reference	  it	  merely	  as	  an	  arrangement.	  The	  drawback	  to	  this,	  however,	  is	  that	  there	  are	  some	  less	  than	  intuitive	  consequences	  that	  arise	  as	  a	  result.	  Universalists	  are	  committed	  to	  saying	  that	  any	  combination	  of	  x’s	  composes	  a	  y,	  no	  matter	  how	  seemingly	  ridiculous.	  In	  addition	  to	  chairs	  and	  apples,	  universalists	  also	  accept	  unusual	  combinations	  such	  as	  the	  moon	  and	  the	  sun,	  or	  the	  Eiffel	  Tower	  plus	  the	  Statue	  of	  liberty.	  These	  objects	  can	  be	  incredibly	  disjointed	  and	  outlandish;	  universalists	  allow	  for	  an	  object	  composed	  of	  the	  front	  end	  of	  a	  horse	  and	  every	  pumpkin	  pie	  on	  earth.	  	  But	  no	  matter	  how	  distant	  these	  pieces	  may	  be,	  there	  is	  a	  single	  resulting	  object	  composed	  of	  those	  pieces.	  Why	  should	  such	  a	  view	  be	  taken	  seriously?	  Universalism’s	  appeal	  is	  actually	  quite	  similar	  to	  nihilism’s	  in	  a	  lot	  of	  ways.	  This	  is	  perhaps	  because	  of	  universalism’s	  role	  as	  a	  logical	  counterpart	  to	  nihilism.	  If	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nihilists	  claim	  that	  composition	  never	  occurs	  under	  any	  circumstance,	  then	  universalists	  claim	  that	  composition	  always	  occurs,	  and	  under	  any	  given	  circumstances.	  The	  resulting	  approach	  for	  universalists	  has	  that	  similar	  degree	  of	  conceptual	  simplicity;	  it	  gives	  a	  flat	  answer	  to	  the	  special	  composition	  question	  without	  needing	  to	  add	  much	  complexity	  to	  the	  issue.	  Universalists	  manage	  to	  dodge	  many	  of	  the	  same	  puzzles	  as	  the	  nihilists.	  In	  our	  “Problem	  of	  the	  Many”,	  for	  instance,	  a	  universalist	  would	  probably	  be	  okay	  with	  allowing	  for	  a	  near	  infinite	  number	  of	  composite	  objects	  to	  exist	  within	  something	  like	  a	  cloud.	  If	  any	  given	  x’s	  compose	  an	  object,	  then	  any	  of	  the	  arrangements	  we	  can	  make	  based	  on	  given	  x’s	  in	  a	  cloud	  should	  also	  compose	  an	  object.	  This	  being	  said,	  universalism	  might	  not	  tackle	  all	  of	  these	  puzzles	  with	  the	  same	  ease	  as	  nihilism.	  In	  the	  puzzle	  of	  “the	  Statue	  and	  the	  Clay”,	  universalism	  does	  not	  by	  itself	  give	  some	  sort	  of	  explanation	  as	  to	  relation	  between	  the	  clay	  and	  the	  statue,	  and	  why	  one	  seems	  to	  go	  out	  of	  existence	  and	  to	  become	  replaced	  by	  the	  other.	  Nihilists	  hardly	  even	  need	  to	  acknowledge	  such	  questions,	  because	  there	  are	  no	  composite	  objects	  being	  created	  or	  destroyed.	  	   The	  absurdities	  that	  universalists	  allow	  in	  their	  ontology	  often	  do	  more	  than	  enough	  to	  deter	  many	  philosophers,	  	  but	  there	  are	  still	  plenty	  who	  are	  willing	  	  to	  obstinately	  support	  the	  view.	  For	  those	  inclined	  to	  argue,	  Peter	  van	  Inwagen	  makes	  a	  more	  targeted	  case	  against	  universalism	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  inconsistencies	  regarding	  continued	  identity	  and	  the	  participation	  of	  the	  same	  x’s	  in	  multiple	  objects	  across	  time.	  Picture	  for	  a	  moment	  the	  atoms	  that	  make	  up	  a	  human	  being.	  They	  are	  not	  stagnant,	  but	  are	  constantly	  being	  exchanged	  over	  time,	  such	  that	  we	  can	  imagine	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that	  all	  of	  the	  atoms	  in	  my	  body	  today	  differ	  from	  those	  in	  my	  body	  ten	  years	  ago.	  But	  I	  exist	  now,	  and	  I	  also	  existed	  ten	  years	  ago;	  the	  same	  is	  true	  of	  each	  atom	  that	  participated	  in	  my	  body	  both	  ten	  years	  ago	  and	  today.	  According	  to	  the	  universalist,	  says	  van	  Inwagen,	  any	  particular	  x’s	  that	  compose	  a	  given	  object	  continue	  do	  so	  regardless	  of	  their	  positioning.	  A	  car,	  for	  example,	  is	  still	  a	  car	  even	  if	  we	  lower	  its	  windows.	  So	  the	  atoms	  that	  made	  up	  my	  body	  ten	  years	  ago	  should	  still	  be	  said	  to	  compose	  me	  today,	  since	  we	  are	  ignoring	  their	  position	  in	  space.	  If	  that’s	  the	  case,	  then	  why	  is	  it	  that	  I	  currently	  consist	  of	  newer	  atoms	  that	  were	  not	  a	  part	  of	  me	  in	  the	  past?	  The	  alternative	  claim	  that	  a	  universalist	  could	  make	  is	  that	  spatial	  position	  actually	  does	  play	  a	  role	  in	  objecthood,	  and	  a	  car	  with	  its	  windows	  down	  is	  a	  distinct	  object	  from	  its	  closed	  counterpart.	  But	  this	  is	  claim	  would	  seem	  just	  as	  absurd;	  turning	  the	  steering	  wheel	  of	  a	  car	  would	  mean	  the	  creation	  and	  destruction	  of	  an	  infinite	  number	  of	  new	  cars,	  each	  existing	  for	  an	  infinitesimal	  amount	  of	  time	  as	  the	  wheel	  is	  moved	  (van	  Inwagen	  75,	  Rea	  348).	  	  	   Dissatisfied	  with	  both	  of	  the	  more	  extreme	  views,	  a	  moderate	  answer	  to	  the	  special	  composition	  question	  attempts	  to	  find	  some	  sort	  of	  middle	  ground.	  These	  views	  claim	  that	  only	  certain	  arrangements	  of	  simples	  count	  as	  objects,	  while	  other	  arrangements	  fail	  to	  do	  so.	  Moderate	  views	  are	  generally	  motivated	  by	  intuitions	  that	  conflict	  with	  nihilist	  and	  universalist	  views;	  certainly	  we	  want	  to	  believe	  that	  a	  table	  is	  an	  object,	  but	  we	  wouldn’t	  ordinarily	  want	  to	  say	  that	  there	  is	  an	  object	  composed	  of	  every	  national	  monument.	  A	  moderate	  approach	  tries	  to	  satisfyingly	  draw	  the	  line	  between	  object	  and	  non-­‐object.	  Historically,	  most	  moderate	  approaches	  can	  prove	  difficult	  to	  defend;	  they	  lack	  the	  same	  ideological	  simplicity	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that	  nihilists	  and	  universalists	  have.	  There	  has	  been	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  diversity	  among	  such	  strategies,	  however.	  These	  views	  tend	  to	  differ	  in	  the	  sort	  of	  condition	  they	  use	  that,	  when	  fulfilled,	  lends	  objecthood	  to	  an	  arrangement	  of	  simples.	  The	  most	  common	  type	  of	  conditions	  that	  are	  suggested	  deal	  with	  the	  spatial	  relationship	  between	  simples.	  Some	  of	  these	  can	  be	  incredibly	  straightforward,	  for	  instance	  one	  suggestion	  is	  that	  an	  arrangement	  of	  simples	  is	  considered	  an	  object	  as	  long	  as	  those	  simples	  are	  touching	  one	  another.	  We	  call	  this	  the	  “contact”	  condition.	  In	  theory,	  this	  idea	  seems	  to	  make	  sense,	  but	  in	  practice	  there	  are	  some	  huge	  problems.	  Physicists	  tell	  us	  that	  the	  particles	  of	  matter	  never	  actually	  touch,	  and	  that	  even	  solid	  objects	  are	  technically	  composed	  of	  mostly	  empty	  space,	  with	  a	  bit	  of	  substance	  thrown	  in.	  Even	  ignoring	  that	  fact,	  the	  contact	  condition	  would	  imply	  that	  my	  shoes	  form	  a	  single	  composite	  object	  with	  the	  floor	  tiles	  they	  come	  into	  contact	  with.	  We	  wouldn’t	  want	  to	  ascribe	  objecthood	  based	  on	  such	  a	  loose	  and	  unintuitive	  association.	  	  	   It	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  how	  this	  type	  of	  moderate	  view	  could	  go	  awry	  when	  it	  relies	  on	  such	  a	  simplistic	  condition.	  But	  perhaps	  one	  might	  attempt	  to	  work	  their	  way	  around	  these	  issues	  by	  adding	  to	  their	  account.	  Following	  after	  the	  contact	  condition,	  we	  might	  consider	  “fastening”	  to	  be	  a	  better	  alternative.	  The	  fastening	  condition	  states	  that	  some	  number	  of	  x’s	  compose	  a	  y	  if	  those	  x’s	  cannot	  be	  easily	  separated.	  At	  face	  value,	  this	  solves	  the	  problems	  faced	  by	  the	  contact	  condition;	  my	  shoes	  are	  not	  one	  with	  the	  ground	  because	  they	  are	  too	  easily	  separated.	  But	  with	  what	  criteria	  do	  we	  determine	  the	  difficulty	  of	  separating	  the	  two	  objects?	  There	  certainly	  seems	  to	  be	  some	  vagueness	  here,	  and	  any	  chosen	  amount	  of	  force	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  arbitrary.	  We	  can	  also	  think	  of	  more	  counterexamples	  that	  should	  not	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count	  as	  composite	  objects:	  a	  belt	  can	  be	  quite	  securely	  fastened	  to	  a	  pair	  of	  pants,	  but	  we	  would	  hesitate	  to	  say	  that	  they	  form	  one	  composite	  object.	  Rather	  than	  requiring	  some	  level	  of	  difficulty	  in	  separating	  x’s	  from	  one	  another,	  what	  if	  we	  say	  that	  they	  must	  be	  inseparable	  without	  breaking?	  If	  we	  put	  forward	  this	  breaking	  condition,	  then	  we	  avoid	  the	  fastening	  problem	  of	  deciding	  what	  level	  of	  separation	  difficulty	  is	  permissible	  for	  objecthood.	  Still,	  we	  face	  the	  same	  problem	  of	  allowing	  for	  unconventional	  objects.	  We	  might	  be	  forced	  to	  say	  that	  any	  two	  objects	  can	  become	  one	  if	  we	  apply	  a	  bit	  of	  superglue.	  	   What	  if	  we	  made	  our	  criteria	  even	  more	  stringent?	  Some	  might	  propose	  “fusion”	  as	  an	  acceptable	  standard	  wherein	  x’s	  compose	  a	  y	  if	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  divide	  between	  the	  x’s.	  Unfortunately	  this	  attempt	  goes	  a	  bit	  too	  far,	  ruling	  out	  potential	  composite	  objects	  that	  we	  would	  ordinarily	  want.	  Think	  about	  a	  hammer,	  for	  instance.	  We	  can	  easily	  see	  a	  divide	  between	  the	  metal	  head	  of	  a	  hammer	  and	  its	  wooden	  handle.	  If	  we	  were	  to	  rely	  on	  fusion,	  we	  would	  need	  to	  reject	  the	  existence	  of	  hammers	  as	  composite	  objects.	  Once	  again,	  it	  seems	  that	  our	  efforts	  go	  awry.	  	  	   These	  examples	  serve	  as	  a	  testimony	  to	  the	  great	  difficulties	  moderate	  views	  must	  overcome.	  Universalism	  and	  nihilism,	  although	  extreme,	  each	  have	  a	  certain	  simplicity	  to	  them	  that	  is	  appealing.	  When	  we	  head	  down	  the	  moderate	  path,	  we	  start	  having	  to	  complicate	  our	  account	  such	  that	  this	  appealing	  simplicity	  is	  lost.	  Moderates	  need	  to	  satisfy	  two	  different	  questions:	  Why	  are	  certain	  arrangements	  composite	  objects?	  And	  why	  are	  other	  arrangements	  not	  composite	  objects?	  They	  need	  to	  come	  up	  with	  the	  criteria	  that	  satisfyingly	  draws	  the	  line	  between	  object	  and	  non-­‐object.	  And	  this,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  is	  a	  rather	  difficult	  task.	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What	  do	  these	  moderate	  views	  have	  in	  common?	  They	  all	  attempt	  to	  define	  objecthood	  in	  terms	  of	  spatial	  relationships	  between	  x’s.	  But	  not	  all	  moderate	  views	  necessarily	  deal	  with	  these	  spatial	  position	  conditions,	  however.	  	  One	  moderate	  view	  that	  I	  will	  go	  into	  particular	  detail	  with	  comes	  from	  Peter	  van	  Inwagen,	  who	  we	  might	  consider	  to	  be	  the	  founder	  of	  this	  special	  composition	  question.	  His	  particular	  take	  on	  the	  special	  composition	  question	  uses	  “life”	  as	  the	  criteria;	  some	  x’s	  can	  be	  said	  to	  compose	  an	  object	  if	  they	  constitute	  a	  living	  thing.	  This	  view,	  although	  quite	  popular	  with	  some,	  remains	  somewhat	  unsatisfying.	  There	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  any	  immediate	  violation	  of	  our	  intuitions,	  however.	  I	  will	  be	  discussing	  van	  Inwagen,	  as	  well	  as	  emergent	  properties,	  in	  much	  greater	  detail	  later	  on	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  The	  view	  that	  I	  will	  defend	  in	  this	  thesis	  will	  also	  fall	  in	  the	  moderate	  domain;	  I	  claim	  that	  some	  things	  are	  composite	  objects,	  while	  others	  are	  not.	  There	  are	  certain	  issues	  I	  take	  with	  both	  nihilists	  and	  universalists,	  so	  naturally	  I	  must	  take	  the	  moderate	  middle	  ground.	  First	  and	  foremost	  among	  the	  issues	  with	  nihilism	  and	  universalism	  is	  that	  neither	  view	  accords	  with	  our	  intuitions	  regarding	  what	  things	  count	  as	  ordinary	  objects.	  For	  nihilists,	  the	  issue	  stems	  from	  their	  refusal	  to	  recognize	  the	  existence	  of	  ordinary	  objects.	  The	  term	  “ordinary	  objects”	  is	  often	  used	  by	  philosophers	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  layperson’s	  conception	  of	  an	  object	  (Thomasson	  9).	  When	  we	  speak	  of	  these	  ordinary	  objects,	  we	  cast	  aside	  theory	  and	  attempt	  to	  see	  the	  world	  based	  on	  our	  intuitions.	  Chairs,	  apples,	  people,	  rocks;	  all	  of	  these	  are	  ordinary	  objects	  because	  they	  fit	  with	  our	  intuitions	  about	  the	  world.	  Nihilists	  claim	  that	  there	  are	  no	  composite	  objects,	  which	  is	  in	  clear	  conflict	  with	  our	  intuitions	  about	  ordinary	  objects.	  The	  violation	  of	  intuitions	  for	  universalists	  lies	  not	  with	  the	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objects	  they	  disallow,	  but	  with	  the	  absurd	  ones	  that	  they	  permit.	  In	  the	  coming	  chapter,	  I	  will	  be	  addressing	  a	  moderate	  approach	  by	  Peter	  van	  Inwagen	  that	  shows	  some	  promise,	  and	  has	  wider	  implications	  involving	  emergent	  properties.	  Beyond	  that	  chapter,	  I’ll	  delve	  into	  my	  own	  account,	  providing	  a	  much	  closer	  look	  into	  the	  intricacies	  of	  this	  psychological	  approach	  that	  emphasizes	  the	  origins	  of	  our	  perceptual	  intuitions.	  There	  is	  a	  history	  behind	  how	  we	  see	  the	  world,	  and	  we	  can	  use	  our	  knowledge	  of	  human	  tendencies	  to	  predict	  what	  will	  count	  as	  an	  object	  for	  a	  given	  person.	  	  
Chapter	  2	  -­‐	  Van	  Inwagen	  and	  Related	  Approaches	  
	  
2.1-­‐	  Life	  as	  a	  Condition	  for	  Objecthood	  In	  my	  first	  chapter,	  I	  gave	  a	  detailed	  explanation	  as	  to	  why	  the	  extremist	  views	  on	  composition,	  nihilism	  and	  universalism,	  are	  ultimately	  unsatisfying.	  I	  gave	  a	  further	  account	  ruling	  out	  moderate	  views	  that	  rely	  on	  spatial	  relationships.	  Now	  I	  will	  address	  one	  alternative	  approach	  that	  requires	  a	  deeper	  examination.	  I	  am	  not	  alone	  in	  my	  attempt	  at	  a	  satisfying	  moderate	  answer	  to	  the	  special	  composition	  question;	  there	  are	  others	  who	  find	  nihilism	  and	  universalism	  to	  be	  too	  extreme.	  One	  rather	  influential	  answer	  comes	  from	  Peter	  van	  Inwagen,	  a	  major	  figure	  when	  we	  are	  discussing	  composite	  objects.	  	  According	  to	  van	  Inwagen,	  an	  arrangement	  of	  simples	  can	  only	  be	  said	  to	  be	  an	  object	  if	  the	  said	  arrangement	  constitutes	  a	  living	  organism.	  Humans	  and	  animals	  would	  count	  as	  objects,	  but	  the	  same	  is	  not	  true	  for	  tables	  and	  chairs.	  Van	  Inwagen	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calls	  this	  approach	  “The	  Denial”,	  highlighting	  his	  elimination	  of	  non-­‐living	  composite	  objects	  from	  our	  ontology.	  The	  concept	  is	  interesting	  enough,	  but	  van	  Inwagen	  has	  a	  large	  explanatory	  goal	  that	  he	  needs	  to	  complete,	  just	  as	  any	  moderate	  approach	  would	  have.	  By	  taking	  a	  moderate	  standpoint,	  van	  Inwagen	  must	  explain	  why	  non-­‐living	  arrangements	  of	  matter	  do	  not	  count	  as	  objects.	  But,	  more	  than	  that,	  he	  must	  also	  demonstrate	  which	  peculiarities	  set	  living	  things	  apart	  from	  other	  arrangements	  of	  matter.	  How	  does	  van	  Inwagen	  approach	  these	  two	  goals?	  	  Perhaps	  the	  best	  place	  to	  begin	  is	  with	  a	  brief	  mention	  of	  what	  van	  Inwagen	  means	  when	  he	  refers	  to	  a	  “living	  organism”.	  We	  might	  look	  to	  biologists	  for	  the	  most	  accurate	  definition	  of	  life,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  helpful	  that	  we	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  term	  as	  van	  Inwagen	  uses	  it	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Material	  Beings	  (1990).	  Living	  organisms	  are	  distinguishable	  from	  nonliving	  composite	  objects	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  complex	  organization	  that	  remains	  in	  a	  relatively	  stable	  pattern	  across	  time.	  Living	  things	  are	  not	  static	  entities;	  they	  constantly	  take	  in	  new	  particles	  and	  expel	  old	  ones.	  Van	  Inwagen	  refers	  to	  them	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  “event”	  akin	  to	  an	  ocean	  wave	  or	  a	  school	  club	  with	  ever-­‐changing	  members.	  An	  odd	  facet	  of	  van	  Inwagen’s	  definition	  is	  that	  he	  does	  not	  think	  that	  any	  given	  x’s	  can	  constitute	  more	  than	  a	  single	  life	  at	  a	  time…	  unless	  one	  of	  those	  lives	  is	  subordinate	  to	  the	  other	  the	  way	  living	  cells	  make	  up	  a	  human	  being.	  Living	  things	  are	  “jealous”	  in	  the	  way	  they	  disallow	  their	  x’s	  from	  overlapping	  in	  other	  lives	  (van	  Inwagen	  89).	  This	  strange	  stipulation	  is	  meant	  to	  make	  living	  things	  distinct	  from	  other	  events,	  such	  as	  waves	  in	  the	  ocean.	  An	  ocean	  wave	  is	  a	  relatively	  stable	  pattern	  of	  interchangeable	  particles;	  in	  a	  lot	  of	  ways	  it	  is	  quite	  like	  a	  living	  thing.	  But	  the	  x’s	  in	  a	  wave	  might	  also	  participate	  in	  another	  wave	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simultaneously;	  waves	  are	  not	  “jealous”	  the	  way	  that	  living	  organisms	  like	  plants	  or	  and	  animals	  are.	  Given	  this	  picture	  of	  a	  life,	  how	  does	  van	  Inwagen	  proceed?	  In	  The	  Denial,	  van	  Inwagen	  attempts	  to	  reconcile	  our	  own	  existence	  with	  the	  way	  we	  talk	  about	  existence	  in	  ordinary	  life.	  Surely	  these	  two	  ways	  of	  referring	  to	  existence	  are	  different	  from	  one	  another?	  Eli	  Hirsch	  gives	  an	  excellent	  formulation	  the	  argument,	  which	  is	  as	  follows	  (Hirsch	  687):	  1. Our	  concept	  of	  existence	  cannot	  be	  metaphysically	  arbitrary.	  	   2. If	  we	  are	  guided	  by	  how	  people	  use	  the	  existential	  quantifier	  in	  the	  ordinary	  business	  of	  life,	  it	  will	  seem	  that	  our	  concept	  of	  existence	  is	  metaphysically	  arbitrary.	  	   3. Therefore	  there	  must	  be	  a	  strict,	  philosophical	  sense	  of	  the	  quantifier,	  different	  from	  its	  use	  in	  the	  ordinary	  business	  of	  life,	  which	  expresses	  the	  non-­‐arbitrary	  concept	  of	  existence.	  	   4. I	  exist	  in	  the	  strict	  sense,	  and	  I	  am	  a	  living	  organism.	  	   5. If	  I	  exist	  in	  the	  strict	  sense,	  and	  I	  am	  a	  living	  organism,	  then	  it	  would	  be	  arbitrary	  to	  suppose	  that	  other	  kinds	  of	  living	  organisms	  do	  not	  exist	  in	  the	  strict	  sense.	  	   6. Therefore	  many	  kinds	  of	  living	  organisms	  do	  exist	  in	  the	  strict	  sense.	  	   7. To	  allow	  that	  any	  other	  composite	  things	  besides	  living	  organisms	  exist	  in	  the	  strict	  sense	  would	  make	  the	  concept	  of	  existence	  in	  the	  strict	  sense	  arbitrary.	  	   8. Therefore	  the	  only	  composite	  things	  that	  exist	  in	  the	  strict	  sense	  are	  living	  organisms.	  	   The	  argument	  here	  relies	  on	  a	  few	  important	  points.	  According	  to	  Hirsch,	  the	  most	  fundamental	  premise	  that	  van	  Inwagen	  is	  relying	  on	  is	  the	  “non-­‐arbitrariness	  principle”	  (Hirsch	  687),	  our	  first	  premise.	  To	  illustrate	  this	  principle,	  think	  of	  a	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statue.	  It	  is	  some	  arrangement	  of	  matter	  that	  has	  been	  molded	  by	  a	  sculptor	  into	  a	  given	  shape,	  and	  then	  given	  the	  name	  “statue”.	  Although	  we	  are	  inclined	  to	  call	  statues	  objects,	  it	  also	  seems	  true	  that	  the	  arrangement	  called	  a	  statue	  came	  about	  in	  an	  arbitrary	  way.	  We	  might,	  as	  van	  Inwagen	  suggests,	  knead	  a	  ball	  of	  clay	  into	  some	  complicated	  arrangement	  and	  then	  call	  such	  an	  object	  of	  that	  shape	  a	  “gollyswaggle”	  (van	  Inwagen	  126).	  To	  believe	  in	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  “gollyswaggle”	  is	  far	  less	  intuitive	  than	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  statue.	  Van	  Inwagen	  thinks	  that	  our	  concept	  of	  existence	  cannot	  be	  arbitrary	  (at	  least	  in	  the	  strict	  sense).	  If	  we	  reject	  the	  existence	  of	  gollyswaggles	  (and	  Van	  Inwagen	  thinks	  we	  should),	  then	  it	  seems	  that	  we	  must	  also	  reject	  the	  existence	  of	  statues	  and	  similarly	  arbitrary	  “objects”.	  When	  we	  make	  decisions	  or	  hold	  beliefs	  arbitrarily,	  van	  Inwagen	  would	  argue	  that	  those	  belief	  or	  decisions	  are	  unjustified.	  Another	  detail	  of	  The	  Denial	  that	  should	  be	  noted	  is	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  different	  ways	  we	  discuss	  existence.	  Considering	  statues	  once	  again,	  the	  way	  people	  talk	  about	  existence	  in	  ordinary	  life	  seems	  metaphysically	  arbitrary;	  a	  statue	  is	  just	  an	  arrangement	  that	  we	  gave	  a	  name	  to.	  Van	  Inwagen	  says	  that	  this	  cannot	  be	  the	  case;	  our	  concept	  of	  existence	  can’t	  be	  arbitrary.	  Therefore,	  there	  must	  also	  be	  a	  strict	  sense	  in	  which	  we	  refer	  to	  existence	  that	  differs	  from	  its	  usage	  in	  everyday	  conversations.	  Statements	  we	  make	  toward	  supposed	  composite	  objects	  can	  be	  literally	  true	  in	  the	  ordinary	  business	  of	  life,	  while	  still	  being	  false	  in	  this	  stricter	  philosophical	  sense.	  	  Given	  the	  arbitrary	  sense	  of	  existence	  that	  is	  expressed	  through	  ordinary	  vernacular,	  there	  must	  be	  also	  strict	  sense	  of	  existence	  (given	  our	  first	  premise).	  So	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what	  can	  we	  be	  sure	  exists	  in	  even	  this	  strict	  sense?	  The	  only	  clear	  candidate	  for	  existence	  is	  oneself.	  This	  idea	  traces	  back	  to	  Descartes	  and	  his	  famous	  Cogito	  Argument,	  “I	  think,	  therefore	  I	  am”.	  Perhaps	  a	  clearer	  way	  of	  putting	  this	  statement	  is	  something	  closer	  to	  “I	  am	  in	  the	  process	  of	  thinking,	  therefore	  there	  must	  at	  the	  very	  least	  be	  something	  doing	  this	  thinking”.	  This	  argument	  has	  been	  widely	  accepted,	  and	  is	  very	  often	  foundational	  to	  arguments	  of	  existence.	  	  Although	  van	  Inwagen	  approaches	  the	  issue	  in	  a	  roundabout	  way,	  it	  seems	  as	  if	  one	  critical	  element	  in	  this	  argument	  is	  conscious	  experience.	  I	  can	  be	  sure	  that	  I	  exist	  in	  a	  strict	  sense	  because	  of	  Descartes’	  classic	  Cogito;	  I	  am	  in	  the	  process	  of	  considering	  my	  existence,	  so	  there	  must	  be	  something	  undergoing	  that	  consideration.	  This	  seems	  fine	  enough,	  but	  van	  Inwagen	  goes	  on	  to	  extend	  this	  notion	  to	  other	  living	  things.	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  he	  makes	  too	  many	  assumptions	  in	  his	  attempts	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  latter	  portion	  of	  the	  fourth	  premise	  will	  likely	  meet	  with	  resistance	  from	  a	  certain	  subset	  of	  philosophers:	  that	  “I”	  am	  a	  composite	  object.	  Although	  our	  perceptual	  experience	  is	  constantly	  joined	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  our	  body,	  there	  might	  be	  those	  who	  are	  inclined	  to	  question	  this	  relationship	  between	  the	  two.	  It	  is	  at	  least	  imaginable	  the	  mind	  is	  a	  separate	  entity	  from	  the	  body,	  with	  the	  body	  merely	  being	  an	  arrangement	  of	  x’s	  that	  carry	  along	  with	  us.	  If	  this	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  case,	  then	  van	  Inwagen	  would	  lack	  the	  metaphysical	  glue	  he	  needs	  in	  order	  to	  say	  that	  one’s	  own	  body	  exists	  as	  a	  composite	  object	  in	  a	  strict	  sense.	  Those	  inclined	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  soul	  or	  some	  type	  of	  mind-­‐body	  dualism	  would	  already	  find	  fault	  with	  van	  Inwagen’s	  argument	  for	  this	  reason.	  	  But	  perhaps	  we	  are	  willing	  to	  entertain	  this	  assumption,	  and	  say	  that	  I	  really	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am	  a	  composite	  object.	  This	  would	  entail	  that	  at	  least	  one	  composite	  object	  exists	  in	  a	  strict	  sense.	  Van	  Inwagen’s	  next	  assumption,	  however,	  is	  that	  it	  would	  be	  arbitrary	  to	  not	  extend	  this	  same	  strict	  objecthood	  to	  all	  other	  living	  things.	  After	  all,	  van	  Inwagen	  argues,	  wouldn’t	  it	  be	  arbitrary	  to	  call	  one	  living	  organism	  an	  object	  and	  not	  the	  others?	  I	  take	  this	  to	  be	  too	  grand	  of	  a	  leap	  forward.	  As	  I	  understand	  it,	  we	  initially	  laid	  claim	  to	  our	  own	  existence	  because	  of	  our	  own	  conscious	  thought	  process.	  We	  then	  proceeded	  to	  extend	  that	  privilege	  of	  objecthood	  to	  other	  living	  things	  simply	  because	  “it	  would	  be	  arbitrary	  not	  to	  do	  so”.	  But	  I	  am	  not	  satisfied	  that	  this	  is	  enough	  of	  a	  reason;	  surely	  we	  would	  want	  to	  appeal	  to	  more	  than	  just	  this	  non-­‐arbitrariness	  principle	  when	  we	  make	  such	  a	  huge	  step	  forward	  from	  our	  starting	  point.	  Surely	  there	  is	  a	  deeper	  reason	  for	  extending	  existence	  to	  other	  living	  organisms.	  I	  think	  the	  underlying	  point	  that	  van	  Inwagen	  is	  making	  is	  that	  if	  I	  exist,	  then	  arrangements	  of	  matter	  that	  are	  similar	  to	  myself	  must	  also	  exist.	  We	  have	  a	  conscious	  experience	  that	  can	  make	  our	  existence	  known	  on	  an	  introspective	  level;	  perhaps	  similarly	  arranged	  things	  also	  have	  this	  conscious	  component	  that	  ensures	  their	  existence.	  But	  van	  Inwagen	  considers	  non-­‐conscious	  living	  things	  such	  as	  bacteria	  or	  trees	  to	  be	  composite	  objects.	  Perhaps	  we	  could	  expect	  this	  consciousness	  from	  intelligent	  animals,	  but	  when	  we	  ascribe	  objecthood	  to	  plants	  and	  microscopic	  organisms,	  it	  would	  seem	  as	  if	  we	  would	  be	  doing	  so	  against	  reason.	  Perhaps	  van	  Inwagen	  does	  not	  want	  to	  involve	  consciousness;	  he	  just	  thinks	  that	  it	  would	  be	  arbitrary	  to	  call	  one	  living	  thing	  a	  composite	  object	  in	  the	  strict	  sense	  and	  not	  other	  living	  things.	  But	  in	  that	  case,	  why	  are	  we	  even	  choosing	  to	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focus	  on	  living	  things?	  We	  could	  instead	  have	  said	  “I	  exist	  in	  the	  strict	  sense,	  and	  I	  am	  human-­‐shaped.	  It	  would	  be	  arbitrary	  to	  suppose	  that	  I	  would	  exist	  in	  the	  same	  way,	  but	  not	  other	  human-­‐shaped	  objects.	  Therefore,	  human-­‐shaped	  objects	  must	  exist	  in	  a	  strict	  sense”.	  That	  sort	  of	  argument	  would	  indicate	  that	  a	  mannequin	  exists	  in	  just	  as	  strict	  a	  sense	  as	  a	  human	  being	  does.	  Van	  Inwagen	  would	  respond	  by	  saying	  that	  my	  being	  a	  living	  organism	  is	  the	  most	  general	  property	  I	  have;	  furthermore,	  no	  other	  properties	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  additions	  because	  they	  would	  be	  arbitrarily	  chosen.	  Van	  Inwagen	  paints	  a	  picture	  of	  what	  it	  means	  for	  something	  to	  be	  living,	  but	  it	  is	  still	  not	  entirely	  clear	  why	  life	  in	  particular	  is	  supposed	  to	  hold	  so	  much	  ontological	  value.	  At	  this	  point,	  it’s	  starting	  to	  seem	  as	  if	  van	  Inwagen	  unduly	  values	  living	  things,	  almost	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  biocentrism.	  There	  is	  a	  feel	  to	  this	  argument	  as	  though	  it	  has	  been	  reverse	  engineered;	  what	  circumstances	  can	  be	  put	  in	  place	  such	  that	  living	  things	  are	  the	  only	  objects?	  It	  can	  also	  be	  so	  easy	  to	  get	  caught	  up	  in	  van	  Inwagen’s	  words	  such	  that	  we	  fail	  to	  recognize	  the	  biggest	  flaw	  of	  his	  view:	  the	  violation	  of	  our	  intuitions.	  If	  we	  choose	  only	  to	  regard	  living	  things	  as	  objects,	  then	  we	  fail	  to	  preserve	  our	  intuitions	  about	  ordinary	  objects.	  Van	  Inwagen	  is	  committed	  to	  saying	  that	  tables,	  chairs,	  and	  the	  like	  do	  not	  exist	  as	  anything	  other	  than	  arrangements.	  Wouldn’t	  it	  be	  a	  backwards	  sort	  of	  ontology	  for	  us	  to	  exclude	  ordinary	  objects?	  After	  all,	  one	  might	  call	  it	  common	  sense	  to	  say	  that	  chairs	  exist.	  But	  the	  curious	  thing	  is	  that	  van	  Inwagen	  would	  reject	  this	  claim;	  he	  thinks	  that	  the	  denial	  of	  non-­‐living	  composite	  objects	  accords	  with	  common	  sense	  (van	  Inwagen	  98).	  His	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  talk	  about	  existence	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  the	  key	  here.	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Statements	  we	  make	  toward	  supposed	  composite	  objects	  can	  be	  literally	  true	  in	  everyday	  vernacular,	  but	  not	  in	  the	  strict	  sense	  of	  ontological	  discovery.	  Someone	  making	  the	  statement	  “there	  is	  a	  table	  in	  front	  of	  me”	  in	  an	  ordinary	  context	  does	  not	  mean	  to	  imply	  the	  statement	  “tables	  exist”.	  	  This	  is	  a	  rather	  odd	  claim	  that	  I	  would	  certainly	  disagree	  with.	  If	  I	  were	  to	  approach	  a	  non-­‐philosopher	  and	  ask	  them	  “Do	  chairs	  exist?”,	  what	  response	  would	  I	  expect	  to	  receive?	  “Of	  course	  they	  exist.”	  is	  the	  likely	  answer.	  They	  might	  even	  grow	  suspicious	  that	  I’m	  offering	  a	  trick	  question,	  because	  surely	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  as	  to	  whether	  something	  we	  regularly	  interact	  with	  exists.	  Furthermore,	  our	  responses	  in	  these	  scenarios	  don’t	  typically	  have	  metaphysical	  errata	  attached	  to	  them.	  When	  someone	  says	  “there	  is	  a	  table	  in	  front	  of	  me”,	  they	  don’t	  mean	  “there	  is	  a	  table	  in	  front	  of	  me,	  but	  I	  also	  concede	  that	  it	  might	  not	  be	  a	  table	  if	  tables	  don’t	  actually	  exist”.	  They	  mean	  “there	  is	  a	  table	  in	  front	  of	  me”.	  If	  there	  are	  instances	  where	  a	  stricter	  sense	  of	  a	  sentence	  differs	  from	  the	  ordinary	  sense	  in	  which	  it	  is	  spoken,	  then	  those	  instances	  are	  incompatible	  with	  common	  sense.	  According	  to	  Hirsch,	  van	  Inwagen’s	  efforts	  in	  creating	  this	  distinction	  (between	  ordinary	  and	  strict)	  are	  equivalent	  to	  “constructing	  a	  language	  as	  close	  to	  English	  as	  possible	  except	  that	  it	  satisfies	  the	  non-­‐arbitrariness	  principle”	  (Hirsch	  691).	  As	  long	  as	  we	  plan	  to	  continue	  speaking	  English,	  it	  cannot	  be	  considered	  common	  sense	  for	  ordinary	  non-­‐living	  objects	  to	  not	  exist.	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2.2-­‐	  Merricks	  and	  Emergentism:	  If	  van	  Inwagen	  does	  not	  give	  an	  altogether	  convincing	  argument	  for	  the	  elimination	  of	  ordinary	  nonliving	  composite	  objects,	  then	  perhaps	  we	  might	  consider	  that	  of	  Trenton	  Merricks,	  who	  also	  attempts	  to	  eliminate	  non-­‐living	  composite	  objects.	  Merricks’	  approach	  emphasizes	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  “overdetermination	  principle”.	  If	  some	  x’s	  cause	  an	  event,	  we	  shouldn’t	  think	  that	  anything	  else	  causes	  that	  event	  (such	  as	  y’s).	  The	  exception	  to	  this	  rule	  is	  where	  the	  x’s	  and	  y’s	  jointly	  cause	  the	  event,	  or	  where	  the	  x’s	  cause	  the	  y’s	  to	  cause	  the	  event.	  There	  are	  more	  immediate	  causes	  of	  events	  that	  are	  not	  worth	  referencing	  when	  we	  have	  access	  to	  the	  higher	  order	  causes.	  We	  can	  apply	  this	  notion	  to	  objects.	  Merricks	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  a	  baseball	  breaking	  a	  window.	  If	  we	  can	  say	  that	  the	  supposed	  baseball	  exists,	  then	  it	  is	  causally	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  breaking	  of	  the	  window.	  This	  is	  because	  we	  can	  already	  trace	  the	  breaking	  of	  the	  glass	  back	  to	  the	  causal	  powers	  of	  the	  atoms	  that	  make	  up	  the	  baseball.	  It	  seems	  as	  if	  the	  term	  “baseball”	  is	  unnecessary	  in	  explaining	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  broken	  window	  (Merricks	  56).	  The	  same	  is	  true	  for	  all	  non-­‐living	  composite	  objects:	  if	  they	  exist,	  they	  are	  merely	  overdeterminers	  of	  their	  effects,	  which	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  their	  fundamental	  parts.	  	   I	  am	  sympathetic	  with	  this	  idea	  of	  overdetermination.	  I	  agree	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  especially	  wrong	  with	  using	  terms	  like	  “baseball”	  to	  describe	  some	  baseball-­‐wise	  arrangement	  of	  x’s.	  But	  Merricks	  wants	  to	  say	  that	  the	  baseball	  has	  no	  causal	  powers,	  and	  that	  only	  the	  fundamental	  parts	  do.	  What	  he	  neglects	  is	  the	  potential	  that	  the	  baseball	  has	  to	  produce	  a	  particular	  sensation	  in	  an	  observer,	  a	  sensation	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that	  no	  constituent	  x	  in	  that	  baseball	  could	  account	  for	  by	  itself.	  In	  Chapter	  3,	  I’ll	  go	  into	  much	  greater	  detail	  on	  what	  I	  mean	  by	  this	  “sensation”.	  As	  for	  Merricks’	  stance	  on	  living	  organisms,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Merricks	  focuses	  on	  notions	  of	  personhood.	  He	  does	  not	  reject	  the	  existence	  of	  living	  organisms,	  but	  leaves	  open	  the	  question	  of	  their	  status	  as	  composite	  objects.	  It	  is	  human	  persons	  that	  Merricks	  defends	  in	  particular.	  How	  do	  human	  organisms	  escape	  overdetermination?	  Merricks’	  answer	  is	  that	  our	  constituent	  x’s	  do	  not	  account	  for	  all	  that	  we	  cause,	  making	  humans	  non-­‐redundant	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  unlike	  a	  mere	  baseball.	  Our	  sensory	  experiences,	  he	  would	  say,	  are	  caused	  through	  some	  process	  that	  at	  the	  very	  least	  relies	  on	  “us”	  in	  some	  way,	  as	  opposed	  to	  merely	  the	  individual	  atoms	  of	  our	  bodies	  (Merricks	  88).	  This	  sort	  of	  claim	  closely	  reflects	  a	  concept	  called	  emergence.	  I	  think	  that	  both	  van	  Inwagen	  and	  Merricks	  are	  proposing	  views	  that	  are	  closely	  linked	  with	  what	  we	  would	  call	  “emergent	  properties”,	  specifically	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ontological	  emergence.	  Those	  who	  propose	  ontological	  emergence	  claim	  that	  “some	  things	  which	  are	  fundamental	  are	  not	  ontologically	  independent”	  (Barnes	  882).	  Ontological	  emergence	  involves	  something	  going	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  its	  parts.	  Under	  Merricks’	  reasoning,	  we	  don’t	  want	  to	  refer	  to	  “baseballs”	  because	  we	  can	  trace	  all	  of	  the	  causal	  power	  of	  a	  baseball	  back	  to	  its	  constituent	  x’s.	  But	  what	  if	  the	  baseball	  had	  some	  property	  that	  could	  not	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  x’s,	  something	  that	  went	  “beyond”	  those	  x’s?	  Would	  this	  property	  not	  be	  a	  good	  reason	  for	  considering	  those	  x’s	  as	  a	  single	  baseball?	  This	  is	  what	  we	  mean	  when	  we	  discuss	  emergent	  properties;	  they	  are	  properties	  that	  come	  about	  through	  the	  joint	  effort	  of	  
A	  PSYCHOLOGICAL	  APPROACH	  TO	  THE	  SPECIAL	  COMPOSITION	  QUESTION	  
	   26	  
x’s	  without	  any	  single	  x	  having	  that	  property.	  Although	  the	  existence	  of	  various	  emergent	  properties	  is	  often	  debated,	  there	  is	  one	  single	  property	  that	  appeals	  to	  most	  emergentists:	  consciousness.	  For	  some	  of	  these	  emergentists,	  there	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  be	  an	  obvious	  link	  between	  the	  individual	  bits	  of	  matter	  composing	  a	  human	  being,	  and	  the	  conscious	  experience	  had	  by	  that	  human.	  It’s	  certainly	  a	  difficult	  task	  to	  describe	  how	  any	  single	  particle	  in	  the	  human	  brain	  could	  produce	  the	  rich	  experiences	  that	  humans	  have.	  But	  perhaps	  thought	  of	  together,	  the	  x’s	  in	  a	  human	  could	  actually	  exert	  this	  phenomenon.	  In	  that	  sense,	  consciousness	  is	  a	  property	  that	  gives	  us	  a	  good	  reason	  to	  think	  of	  a	  group	  of	  x’s	  arranged	  human-­‐wise	  as	  a	  human	  being.	  This	  idea	  that	  consciousness	  lends	  objecthood	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  background	  motivation	  for	  mereologists	  such	  as	  van	  Inwagen	  and	  Merricks.	  With	  regards	  to	  this	  emergence-­‐based	  approach,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  consider	  the	  types	  of	  emergence	  that	  exist.	  Just	  as	  van	  Inwagen	  leaves	  the	  task	  of	  defining	  “life”	  to	  biologists,	  I	  leave	  the	  task	  of	  determining	  which	  properties	  are	  emergent	  to	  the	  emergentists.	  	  In	  ‘Downward	  Causation’	  and	  Emergence,	  Jaegwon	  Kim	  brings	  up	  a	  major	  objection	  to	  this	  idea	  of	  ontological	  emergence.	  He	  objects	  to	  this	  view	  based	  on	  the	  implausibility	  of	  “downward	  causation”	  (Kim	  120).	  If	  we	  want	  to	  consider	  the	  plausibility	  of	  something	  like	  ontological	  emergence,	  then	  we	  must	  also	  consider	  the	  implications	  for	  how	  we	  should	  think	  of	  causality	  in	  the	  world.	  Emergentists	  seem	  to	  think	  that	  emergent	  properties,	  such	  as	  consciousness,	  play	  a	  causal	  role	  in	  our	  explanations	  of	  events.	  When	  we	  consider	  that	  the	  world	  consists	  of	  numerous	  interactions	  among	  miniscule	  x’s,	  emergentists	  would	  generally	  be	  inclined	  to	  say	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that	  emergent	  properties	  can	  act	  as	  causal	  explanations	  of	  those	  interactions.	  But	  at	  this	  point,	  a	  new	  question	  arises:	  how	  are	  the	  movements	  of	  these	  x’s	  related	  to	  the	  higher-­‐order	  explanations	  provided	  by	  emergence?	  Can	  ‘consciousness’,	  for	  example,	  fully	  explain	  the	  movement	  of	  atoms	  in	  the	  brain?	  	  	   According	  to	  Jaegwon	  Kim,	  ontological	  emergentists	  face	  a	  serious	  dilemma	  regardless	  of	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  question.	  If	  emergent	  properties	  can	  fully	  explain	  the	  movement	  of	  micro-­‐level	  x’s,	  then	  Kim	  says	  that	  emergent	  properties	  must	  then	  be	  considered	  epiphenomenal;	  their	  explanations	  would	  be	  redundant.	  And	  if	  emergent	  properties	  cannot	  fully	  explain	  the	  movements	  of	  x’s,	  then	  perhaps	  they	  do	  not	  possess	  causal	  powers	  as	  ontological	  emergentists	  claim	  they	  do.	  	   Given	  Kim’s	  account,	  I	  am	  inclined	  to	  reject	  emergence	  as	  a	  potential	  answer	  to	  the	  special	  composition	  question.	  Not	  only	  does	  ontological	  emergence	  lead	  to	  issues	  with	  causation,	  it	  also	  disagrees	  with	  my	  intuitions.	  The	  idea	  that	  some	  properties	  exist	  “over	  and	  above”	  matter	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  be	  too	  fantastic	  of	  a	  notion.	  Up	  to	  this	  point,	  I	  have	  strongly	  hinted	  at	  my	  approach	  to	  the	  special	  composition	  question.	  Now,	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  I	  will	  give	  an	  account	  of	  objecthood	  that	  focuses	  perception	  and	  practicality.	  Our	  conception	  of	  objecthood	  is	  closely	  tied	  with	  the	  observers,	  and	  the	  perceptual	  tendencies	  that	  have	  developed	  over	  the	  course	  of	  their	  evolution.	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Chapter	  3-­‐	  Observers	  as	  the	  Providers	  of	  Objecthood	  	  
3.1-­‐	  Perception,	  Composition,	  and	  Qualia:	  It	  is	  here	  that	  I	  would	  like	  to	  go	  into	  greater	  detail	  with	  my	  approach	  to	  composition.	  There	  have	  been	  many	  answers	  to	  this	  question	  in	  the	  past,	  so	  there	  may	  be	  a	  lingering	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  why	  we	  need	  a	  good	  moderate	  approach.	  Why	  do	  we	  even	  attempt	  to	  make	  moderate	  views?	  Nihilism	  and	  universalism	  are	  at	  least	  somewhat	  compelling,	  after	  all.	  But	  the	  key	  issue	  I	  take	  with	  nihilism	  and	  universalism	  is	  that	  they	  both	  sacrifice	  our	  intuitions,	  albeit	  in	  different	  ways.	  My	  psychological	  approach	  emphasizes	  intuitions.	  I	  argue	  that	  our	  intuitions	  regarding	  ordinary	  objects	  are	  meaningful	  in	  the	  way	  we	  determine	  objecthood.	  I	  also	  feel	  that	  philosophy	  is	  at	  its	  best	  when	  it	  can	  work	  alongside	  the	  sciences.	  Interdisciplinary	  research	  is	  almost	  always	  mutually	  beneficial,	  and	  for	  philosophy,	  it	  can	  help	  to	  ground	  more	  abstract	  issues.	  In	  this	  context,	  a	  psychological	  approach	  allows	  us	  to	  analyze	  the	  physical	  processes	  involved	  in	  determining	  objecthood,	  and	  allow	  us	  to	  be	  more	  predictive	  in	  regards	  to	  what	  a	  given	  person	  will	  see	  as	  a	  composite	  object.	  	  I’ll	  begin	  again	  with	  special	  composition	  question:	  when	  do	  some	  x’s	  compose	  a	  y?	  This	  is	  a	  question	  that	  focuses	  on	  composite	  objects;	  we	  want	  to	  know	  if	  they	  exist.	  And	  if	  they	  do	  actually	  exist,	  we	  want	  to	  know	  what	  conditions,	  if	  any,	  must	  be	  fulfilled	  for	  composition	  to	  occur.	  So	  when	  should	  we	  say	  that	  some	  x’s	  compose	  a	  y?	  Under	  my	  view,	  the	  bottom	  line	  is	  that	  the	  x’s	  in	  question	  need	  to	  be	  sufficiently	  associated	  with	  one	  another,	  such	  that	  a	  given	  observer	  perceives	  the	  arrangement	  as	  an	  object.	  As	  I	  will	  explain	  shortly,	  observers	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	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ascribing	  composite	  objecthood.	  Think	  about	  the	  way	  observers	  look	  at	  the	  chaotic	  world	  around	  them,	  extracting	  the	  information	  they	  need	  to	  continue	  living	  with	  stability.	  We	  can	  perceive	  an	  abundance	  of	  information	  through	  observation:	  color,	  shape,	  texture.	  But	  as	  John	  Locke	  discusses	  in	  An	  Essay	  Concerning	  Human	  Understanding,	  there	  are	  distinctions	  to	  be	  made	  regarding	  this	  information	  as	  it	  exists	  in	  the	  mind	  and	  as	  it	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  world.	  Locke	  distinguishes	  between	  ideas	  and	  qualities.	  Ideas	  are	  what	  the	  mind	  perceives	  within	  itself,	  whereas	  qualities	  are	  what	  have	  the	  power	  to	  produce	  ideas	  within	  us.	  A	  snowball,	  for	  example,	  has	  qualities	  such	  as	  roundness,	  coldness,	  and	  whiteness.	  These	  qualities	  produce	  their	  associated	  sensations	  within	  an	  observer	  (Locke	  29-­‐30).	  	  Locke	  goes	  on	  to	  make	  a	  further	  distinction	  between	  two	  types	  of	  qualities.	  Primary	  qualities	  are	  inseparable	  from	  the	  body	  they	  are	  within.	  These	  include	  qualities	  such	  as	  motion,	  texture,	  and	  solidity;	  they	  are	  inherent	  in	  the	  matter	  itself.	  Secondary	  qualities	  are	  slightly	  different;	  they	  are	  expressible	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  primary	  qualities	  in	  the	  body	  of	  matter,	  but	  there	  is	  nothing	  in	  that	  matter	  itself	  that	  actually	  resembles	  the	  sensation	  within	  the	  observer.	  Secondary	  qualities	  may	  include	  various	  tastes	  and	  colors.	  The	  sensation	  of	  “sweetness”,	  for	  example,	  is	  not	  instantiated	  within	  by	  the	  matter	  that	  composes	  a	  piece	  of	  cake.	  We	  can	  explain	  cake	  in	  terms	  of	  primary	  qualities,	  but	  it	  takes	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  observer	  with	  the	  right	  configuration	  of	  taste	  receptors	  for	  this	  sweet	  sensation	  to	  be	  manifested.	  	  I	  bring	  up	  this	  topic	  because	  there	  is	  a	  particular	  quality	  that	  is	  highly	  relevant	  to	  our	  special	  composition	  question.	  When	  we	  look	  upon	  an	  ordinary	  object	  such	  as	  a	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chair,	  we	  encounter	  a	  number	  of	  sensations	  that	  we	  would	  associate	  with	  the	  qualities	  of	  the	  chair,	  such	  as	  the	  chair’s	  brownness	  or	  its	  solidity.	  In	  observing	  the	  chair,	  we	  also	  have	  the	  sense	  that	  all	  of	  the	  chair’s	  parts	  are	  closely	  associated.	  The	  four	  legs	  of	  the	  chair,	  the	  seat	  of	  the	  chair,	  and	  the	  back	  of	  the	  chair:	  all	  of	  these	  visible	  parts	  seem	  to	  have	  an	  important	  relationship	  with	  one	  another.	  They	  seem	  united,	  as	  if	  they	  are	  all	  forming	  a	  single	  entity.	  This	  sensation	  is	  based	  off	  of	  the	  quality	  that	  I	  would	  call	  “unity”.	  	  What	  can	  we	  say	  about	  this	  sensation	  of	  “unity”?	  To	  start	  with,	  unity	  would	  seem	  to	  operate	  on	  a	  gradient.	  Bodies	  of	  matter	  can	  appear	  to	  us	  as	  more	  united	  or	  less	  united	  than	  one	  another.	  Furthermore,	  there	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  variety	  of	  factors	  that	  can	  influence	  our	  sensation	  of	  unity.	  We	  might	  first	  consider	  the	  relative	  spatial	  location	  among	  the	  x’s;	  certainly	  they	  seem	  more	  united	  when	  they	  are	  closer	  to	  one	  another.	  We	  might	  also	  examine	  the	  appearance	  of	  the	  x’s;	  when	  they	  look	  similar	  to	  one	  another,	  we	  perceive	  a	  stronger	  sense	  of	  unity	  from	  them.	  We	  might	  even	  look	  at	  the	  activity	  of	  the	  x’s;	  whether	  they	  are	  all	  moving	  together	  in	  the	  same	  direction,	  for	  example.	  Given	  these	  considerations,	  I	  propose	  that	  unity	  should	  be	  defined	  as	  “the	  degree	  of	  association	  among	  any	  given	  x’s”.	  	  In	  addition,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  unity	  (at	  least	  in	  the	  compositional	  sense)	  is	  not	  a	  primary	  quality,	  but	  a	  secondary	  one.	  Locke	  says	  that	  primary	  qualities	  are	  “utterly	  inseparable	  from	  the	  body,	  whatever	  state	  it	  is	  in”	  (Locke	  30).	  No	  matter	  how	  you	  act	  upon	  the	  body	  of	  matter	  in	  question,	  chopping	  it	  up	  or	  crushing	  it,	  the	  primary	  qualities	  are	  not	  disrupted;	  a	  brick	  maintains	  its	  solidity	  even	  if	  you	  break	  it.	  Unity,	  however,	  does	  not	  behave	  this	  way.	  It	  actually	  does	  seem	  as	  if	  you	  can	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disrupt	  the	  unity	  of	  a	  body.	  If	  I	  were	  to	  take	  a	  chair	  and	  remove	  its	  legs,	  the	  resulting	  body	  seems	  far	  less	  united	  than	  before.	  And	  if	  I	  then	  took	  the	  pieces	  of	  the	  chair	  and	  painted	  each	  a	  separate	  color,	  we	  might	  fail	  to	  see	  how	  those	  x’s	  are	  associated	  at	  all.	  Unity	  much	  more	  closely	  resembles	  a	  secondary	  quality.	  Secondary	  qualities	  rely	  on	  the	  power	  of	  primary	  qualities	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  sensations	  in	  an	  observer.	  Think	  about	  the	  way	  “redness”	  works.	  The	  body	  of	  matter	  in	  question	  has	  a	  particular	  shape	  and	  texture	  (primary	  qualities)	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  the	  sensation	  of	  redness	  in	  an	  observer	  when	  interacted	  with	  by	  light.	  Doesn’t	  unity	  work	  in	  the	  same	  way?	  Part	  of	  what	  makes	  x’s	  seem	  united	  is	  their	  similar	  textures	  and	  motion.	  This	  type	  of	  reliance	  on	  primary	  qualities	  is	  indicative	  of	  a	  secondary	  quality.	  One	  point	  of	  clarification	  here	  is	  that	  I	  mean	  to	  discuss	  unity	  in	  a	  compositional	  sense.	  If	  mereological	  simples	  exist,	  then	  we	  might	  say	  that	  a	  simple	  has	  the	  highest	  possible	  level	  of	  unity	  among	  its	  “parts”.	  A	  simple’s	  only	  part	  is	  itself,	  so	  its	  “parts”	  have	  reached	  the	  apex	  of	  association:	  oneness.	  So	  how	  does	  this	  notion	  of	  unity	  tie	  back	  into	  the	  special	  composition	  question?	  As	  you	  may	  suspect	  by	  this	  point,	  arrangements	  of	  x’s	  that	  give	  us	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  unity	  are	  excellent	  candidates	  for	  objecthood.	  But	  there	  is	  still	  the	  question	  of	  how	  much	  is	  enough.	  To	  what	  degree	  do	  x’s	  need	  to	  be	  associated	  for	  them	  to	  be	  considered	  a	  composite	  object?	  In	  the	  case	  of	  mereological	  simples,	  they	  surely	  would	  have	  enough	  unity	  to	  be	  considered	  an	  object;	  after	  all,	  you	  can’t	  ask	  for	  more	  than	  oneness.	  If	  they	  exist,	  they	  would	  objectively	  have	  enough	  unity	  to	  be	  considered	  objects.	  But	  non-­‐simples,	  in	  failing	  to	  achieve	  oneness,	  require	  the	  introduction	  of	  some	  evaluative	  component.	  That	  component	  is	  the	  observer.	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Because	  unity	  is	  a	  secondary	  quality,	  we	  cannot	  find	  it	  expressed	  in	  the	  physical	  matter	  of	  the	  world.	  But	  observers,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  capable	  of	  experiencing	  the	  sensation	  of	  unity.	  They	  look	  upon	  some	  x’s	  and	  are	  able	  to	  evaluate	  the	  associated	  sensation	  to	  determine	  objecthood.	  When	  do	  the	  x’s	  pass	  the	  test?	  That	  will	  depend	  upon	  the	  thresholds	  of	  the	  observer	  in	  question.	  A	  given	  level	  of	  association	  among	  x’s	  may	  be	  enough	  to	  convince	  one	  observer,	  but	  not	  another.	  Observers	  are	  not	  all	  alike	  in	  the	  way	  they	  are	  mentally	  wired;	  each	  observer	  can	  process	  perceptions	  differently	  from	  one	  another	  based	  on	  their	  evolutionary	  history	  and	  societal	  interactions.	  We	  see	  this	  reflected	  in	  the	  special	  composition	  question	  itself;	  there	  can	  often	  be	  some	  disagreement	  as	  to	  the	  ontological	  status	  of	  some	  given	  x’s.	  This	  being	  said,	  a	  historical	  account	  of	  the	  development	  of	  human	  perceptions	  can	  give	  us	  a	  much	  better	  idea	  as	  to	  why	  humans	  are,	  in	  general,	  so	  alike	  in	  what	  they	  deem	  to	  be	  objects.	  With	  a	  clearer	  picture	  of	  how	  humans	  process	  the	  world,	  we	  can	  often	  make	  predictions	  as	  to	  what	  the	  typical	  human	  will	  call	  an	  object.	  Before	  I	  delve	  into	  this	  historical	  account,	  I’ll	  address	  one	  question	  that	  may	  have	  arisen	  by	  this	  point.	  I	  mentioned	  that	  objecthood	  is	  determined	  on	  a	  person-­‐by-­‐person	  basis,	  wherein	  the	  sensation	  of	  unity	  is	  matched	  against	  the	  individual’s	  threshold	  for	  object	  determination.	  If	  this	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  case,	  then	  what	  happens	  in	  points	  of	  disagreement	  among	  observers?	  Can	  something	  be	  both	  a	  composite	  object	  and	  not	  a	  composite	  object?	  At	  this	  point	  the	  question	  becomes	  one	  of	  relative	  perspective.	  We	  have	  no	  objective	  reason	  to	  say	  any	  particular	  level	  of	  unity	  is	  enough,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  oneness.	  Instead,	  looking	  at	  subjective	  reasons	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means	  allowing	  for	  occasional	  differences	  in	  outlook.	  If	  you	  really	  want	  to	  know	  what	  counts	  as	  a	  composite	  object,	  the	  best	  person	  to	  ask	  is	  yourself.	  Although	  the	  human	  evaluative	  criteria	  for	  objecthood	  are	  not	  objective,	  that	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  it	  lacks	  meaning.	  As	  I	  hope	  to	  get	  across	  with	  an	  evolutionary	  account	  of	  our	  perceptions,	  there	  are	  millions	  of	  years	  of	  human	  development	  that	  have	  gone	  into	  shaping	  our	  intuitions.	  	  	  
3.2-­‐	  The	  Development	  of	  Perception:	  	   People	  view	  the	  same	  stimuli	  in	  the	  environment	  around	  them,	  but	  may	  not	  perceive	  these	  stimuli	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  one	  another.	  And	  even	  when	  we	  do	  perceive	  things	  the	  same	  way,	  we	  may	  differ	  in	  the	  way	  these	  perceptions	  are	  processed.	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  I	  place	  great	  importance	  upon	  such	  psychological	  underpinnings.	  While	  individual	  differences	  in	  outlook	  naturally	  arise,	  it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  there	  is	  an	  “average”	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  the	  world	  among	  humans.	  This	  is	  because	  of	  the	  shared	  perceptual	  tendencies	  that	  we	  have	  developed.	  In	  psychology,	  we	  often	  talk	  about	  the	  way	  observers	  organize	  the	  barrage	  of	  sensory	  inputs	  from	  the	  outside	  world.	  There	  is	  a	  constant	  flood	  of	  information	  streaming	  from	  our	  environment,	  yet	  we	  are	  able	  to	  sort	  through	  it	  all	  and	  extract	  the	  pieces	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  us.	  This	  process	  of	  sorting	  through	  sensory	  information	  is	  evolutionarily	  advantageous;	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  pick	  up	  on	  patterns	  that	  are	  vital	  to	  survival	  and	  reproduction.	  In	  a	  sense,	  humans	  (and	  any	  other	  organisms	  capable	  of	  perception)	  could	  be	  considered	  pattern-­‐recognition	  machines.	  For	  living	  things	  to	  survive	  and	  reproduce,	  they	  must	  be	  able	  to	  distinguish	  between	  different	  external	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stimuli.	  There	  is	  a	  huge	  difference	  between	  encountering	  a	  mate	  and	  encountering	  a	  predator.	  And	  which	  would	  survive	  longer:	  the	  human	  who	  goes	  around	  eating	  apples,	  or	  the	  one	  who	  goes	  around	  eating	  sharp	  rocks?	  Misidentifying	  a	  predator	  as	  a	  mate	  or	  a	  rock	  as	  an	  apple	  can	  mean	  certain	  death	  in	  an	  unstable	  and	  competitive	  environment.	  The	  organisms	  that	  survive	  are	  the	  ones	  that	  can	  properly	  distinguish	  between	  these	  vital	  stimuli.	  Over	  time	  evolution	  has	  lead	  organisms	  to	  become	  progressively	  more	  efficient	  at	  recognizing	  how	  different	  patterns	  could	  be	  relevant	  to	  themselves.	  The	  point	  here	  is	  that	  only	  specific	  patterns	  in	  the	  environment	  have	  been	  reinforced;	  in	  particular	  those	  that	  have	  proven	  useful	  and	  self-­‐relevant.	  These	  would	  primarily	  include	  patterns	  of	  simples	  that	  can	  easily	  be	  interacted	  with	  and	  would	  explain	  why	  humans	  today	  most	  readily	  identify	  objects	  that	  can	  be	  handled	  and	  manipulated	  in	  some	  way.	  James	  Gibson	  gives	  a	  particularly	  compelling	  account	  of	  the	  development	  of	  human	  perceptions.	  His	  “Theory	  of	  Affordances”	  says	  that	  humans	  came	  to	  identify	  and	  distinguish	  particular	  ‘objects’	  in	  their	  environment	  based	  on	  what	  certain	  features	  of	  the	  environment	  afford	  the	  observer.	  A	  flame,	  for	  example,	  affords	  warmth	  to	  the	  observer.	  A	  wide,	  flat	  surface	  affords	  support.	  In	  this	  way,	  observers	  start	  to	  perceptually	  break	  down	  the	  surfaces	  they	  observe	  into	  meaningful	  chunks	  (i.e.	  this	  chunk	  provides	  warmth,	  while	  this	  chunk	  does	  not).	  One	  feature	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  particularly	  important	  for	  our	  questions	  regarding	  composition.	  Although	  affordances	  are	  based	  off	  of	  physical	  properties	  (“support”	  is	  based	  off	  of	  wideness,	  flatness,	  and	  extendedness),	  the	  affordance	  itself	  is	  something	  that	  will	  differ	  from	  one	  animal	  to	  the	  next.	  Gibson	  gives	  the	  example	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of	  a	  water	  bug.	  To	  a	  water	  bug,	  which	  can	  tread	  along	  the	  surface	  of	  water,	  there	  is	  an	  affordance	  of	  support	  that	  comes	  from	  water	  (Gibson	  120).	  Humans	  do	  not	  receive	  this	  same	  affordance	  of	  support	  from	  water.	  This	  difference	  in	  affordances	  is	  a	  strong	  motivation	  for	  me	  to	  emphasize	  a	  somewhat	  subjective	  aspect	  to	  objecthood.	  Across	  different	  members	  of	  the	  same	  species,	  I	  attempt	  to	  account	  for	  potential	  differences	  in	  observers	  with	  regard	  to	  unity.	  	   Our	  perceptual	  processes	  have	  developed	  to	  such	  a	  degree	  that	  we	  are	  far	  more	  likely	  to	  identify	  self-­‐relevant	  patterns	  as	  objects.	  Of	  course,	  not	  every	  pattern	  we	  encounter	  can	  be	  accounted	  for	  in	  evolution.	  As	  is	  often	  the	  case	  in	  psychology,	  nature	  is	  paired	  with	  nurture.	  There	  are	  ways	  in	  which	  society	  influences	  the	  way	  we	  perceive	  stimuli,	  including	  those	  that	  we	  have	  no	  evolutionary	  account	  of	  (such	  as	  cars	  or	  fire	  extinguishers).	  Consider	  what	  goes	  on	  in	  the	  first	  few	  years	  of	  a	  child’s	  education.	  A	  parent,	  teacher,	  or	  mentor	  will	  show	  the	  child	  a	  picture	  with	  an	  associated	  word.	  This	  is	  a	  common	  method	  of	  teaching	  reading,	  but	  when	  we	  consider	  it	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  special	  composition	  question,	  it	  can	  mean	  quite	  a	  bit	  more.	  When	  an	  authority	  figure	  holds	  up	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  cow,	  they	  are	  reinforcing	  the	  child’s	  ability	  to	  recognize	  that	  arrangement	  as	  a	  single	  object.	  While	  the	  child	  is	  likely	  to	  see	  it	  that	  way	  anyway	  (due	  to	  their	  selected-­‐for	  perceptual	  intuition),	  the	  social	  influences	  solidify	  their	  subjective	  understanding	  of	  such	  arrangements.	  These	  social	  factors	  serve	  to	  fine-­‐tune	  our	  perceptions,	  not	  only	  preparing	  us	  for	  the	  challenges	  of	  modern	  life,	  but	  also	  making	  us	  more	  alike	  in	  the	  way	  we	  analyze	  the	  world	  around	  us.	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Another	  important	  point	  here	  is	  that	  I	  am	  referencing	  observers,	  not	  necessarily	  humans.	  Throughout	  this	  piece	  I	  have	  generally	  argued	  for	  my	  view	  using	  humans.	  These	  serve	  merely	  as	  convenient	  examples	  observers	  that	  we	  are	  intimately	  familiar	  with.	  Objecthood	  can,	  however,	  be	  lent	  to	  an	  arrangement	  by	  any	  variety	  of	  observer.	  Just	  as	  humans	  have	  been	  naturally	  selected	  to	  recognize	  patterns	  in	  nature,	  so	  too	  have	  the	  majority	  of	  living	  things.	  An	  eagle	  soaring	  above	  the	  treetops	  can	  quickly	  identify	  its	  prey	  far	  below	  and	  swoop	  in	  for	  the	  kill.	  The	  way	  an	  eagle	  identifies	  its	  prey	  mirrors	  the	  way	  we	  humans	  recognize	  objects.	  That	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  I	  would	  extend	  this	  privilege	  to	  any	  living	  organism.	  At	  a	  bare	  minimum,	  the	  organism	  must	  be	  able	  to	  observe	  and	  process	  the	  world	  around	  them	  to	  some	  extent.	  This	  disqualifies	  some	  living	  things	  such	  as	  plants,	  fungi,	  certain	  microscopic	  organisms,	  and	  even	  extends	  to	  more	  complex	  organisms	  such	  as	  humans	  and	  animals	  if	  they	  are	  rendered	  incapable	  of	  observation.	  Furthermore,	  observation	  does	  not	  imply	  a	  purely	  visual	  medium.	  Although	  humans	  gain	  most	  of	  their	  information	  through	  visual	  sensory	  data,	  there	  are	  many	  other	  methods	  by	  which	  observers	  can	  come	  to	  recognize	  arrangements	  as	  objects.	  If	  you	  reach	  out	  and	  feel	  something	  that	  is	  solid	  and	  cohesive,	  you	  may	  be	  inclined	  to	  regard	  it	  as	  a	  single	  composite	  object.	  This	  feeling	  would	  be	  all	  the	  greater	  if	  you	  felt	  the	  same	  exact	  texture	  across	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  object.	  Even	  something	  like	  taste	  or	  smell	  can	  be	  used	  in	  this	  way;	  each	  bite	  of	  an	  orange	  comes	  with	  the	  same	  distinct	  tangy	  flavor	  and	  citrusy	  smell,	  so	  we	  believe	  these	  must	  have	  come	  from	  the	  same	  object.	  The	  fact	  that	  this	  is	  possible	  is	  especially	  important	  for	  observers	  that	  lack	  other	  senses.	  Of	  course,	  if	  you	  have	  no	  way	  to	  perceive	  the	  world	  around	  you,	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whether	  through	  natural	  inability	  or	  through	  severe	  injury,	  you	  have	  no	  way	  to	  evaluate	  the	  associations	  between	  x’s.	  Given	  what	  we	  have	  learned	  about	  human	  perception,	  we	  have	  the	  proper	  tools	  to	  predict	  whether	  the	  average	  human	  will	  perceive	  an	  object	  or	  an	  arrangement	  for	  a	  given	  stimulus.	  We	  can	  look	  at	  the	  perceptual	  tendencies	  that	  humans	  have	  developed,	  since	  those	  tendencies	  will	  hold	  major	  influence	  over	  the	  observer’s	  threshold	  for	  object	  determination.	  I	  think	  that	  the	  arrangements	  that	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  called	  objects	  are	  the	  ones	  that	  conform	  to	  the	  broad	  perceptual	  tendencies	  that	  we	  call	  “Gestalt	  Laws”.	  Gestalt	  is	  a	  German	  term	  that	  psychologists	  use	  to	  refer	  to	  unified	  wholes	  in	  perception.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  the	  human	  mind	  has	  particular	  tendencies	  by	  which	  it	  organizes	  sense	  data,	  leading	  to	  the	  extraction	  meaningful	  information	  from	  an	  otherwise	  chaotic	  environment.	  A	  gestalt	  law	  is	  the	  name	  we	  give	  to	  those	  particular	  perceptual	  tendencies.	  We	  might	  consider,	  for	  example,	  the	  Gestalt	  law	  of	  similarity.	  The	  law	  of	  similarity	  states	  that	  we	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  perceptually	  group	  visual	  stimuli	  that	  are	  similar	  to	  one	  another.	  If	  we	  look	  at	  an	  assorted	  pile	  of	  chess	  pieces,	  we’ll	  mentally	  associate	  the	  white	  pieces	  with	  one	  another,	  separating	  them	  from	  the	  black	  pieces	  based	  on	  their	  level	  of	  similarity.	  Another	  principle	  we	  might	  consider	  is	  the	  Gestalt	  law	  of	  continuity.	  We	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  view	  certain	  visual	  stimuli	  together	  if	  their	  orientation	  gives	  the	  impression	  of	  a	  continuous	  extension,	  following	  a	  path	  or	  series.	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A	  dotted	  line	  (as	  shown	  below)	  serves	  as	  an	  excellent	  example	  of	  this	  principle	  of	  continuity:	  	  	  	  	   	  	  Immediately	  our	  eyes	  trace	  a	  dotted	  line	  from	  one	  end	  to	  the	  other,	  viewing	  it	  as	  a	  single	  continuous	  entity,	  rather	  than	  the	  series	  of	  individual	  lines	  that	  make	  it	  up.	  There	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  this	  process	  is	  automatic	  and	  effortless;	  without	  even	  really	  meaning	  to,	  we	  consider	  these	  dashes	  of	  ink	  together.	  Furthermore	  there	  is	  a	  particular	  way	  we	  view	  the	  image.	  We	  are	  inclined	  to	  follow	  the	  looped	  portions	  as	  part	  of	  the	  path	  itself,	  rather	  than	  as	  some	  separate	  portion	  coming	  off	  of	  the	  main	  line.	   This	  idea	  becomes	  all	  the	  more	  interesting	  when	  we	  imagine	  replacing	  our	  dashes	  of	  ink	  with	  x’s	  or	  mereological	  simples.	  A	  dotted	  line	  of	  simples	  would	  be	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  single	  object	  than	  in	  most	  other	  arrangements.	  Though	  the	  simples	  themselves	  can	  hardly	  be	  called	  a	  composite	  object	  under	  most	  definitions;	  after	  all,	  there	  is	  no	  particular	  connectedness	  involved,	  merely	  orientation.	  Simples	  can	  be	  arranged	  is	  ways	  that	  give	  us	  these	  same	  automatic	  intuitions	  of	  relatedness	  that	  would	  ultimately	  result	  in	  the	  sensation	  of	  unity	  that	  I	  have	  in	  mind.	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This	  situation	  becomes	  even	  stranger	  when	  we	  imagine	  a	  dotted	  line	  that	  forms	  an	  outline	  to	  a	  familiar	  shape,	  such	  as	  a	  person.	  We	  still	  don’t	  quite	  want	  to	  say	  that	  the	  dashes	  of	  ink	  (or	  simples	  /	  x’s)	  are	  composing	  something;	  they	  are	  clearly	  separated	  from	  one	  another	  in	  a	  noticeable	  way.	  But	  we	  cannot	  deny	  that	  our	  perceptions	  pick	  out	  certain	  arrangements	  as	  meaningful.	  We’ve	  been	  hardwired	  to	  more	  readily	  make	  these	  perceptions.	  	  	  	   	  	  	   We	  have	  quite	  a	  few	  of	  these	  hardwired	  tendencies,	  and	  they	  all	  impact	  our	  experience	  of	  external	  stimuli	  to	  some	  degree.	  A	  lot	  of	  these	  principles	  may	  seem	  obvious	  at	  a	  glance,	  perhaps	  even	  common	  sense.	  But	  they	  have	  major	  implications	  when	  we	  apply	  them	  to	  the	  special	  composition	  question,	  and	  are	  more	  than	  merely	  visual	  stimuli.	  If	  we	  look	  at	  a	  “dotted	  line”	  as	  a	  singular	  entity,	  then	  why	  not	  a	  dotted	  line	  made	  of	  x’s	  or	  mereological	  simples?	  Or	  better	  yet,	  we	  could	  apply	  a	  number	  of	  gestalt	  principles	  to	  the	  same	  situation,	  just	  as	  they	  would	  in	  reality.	  Imagine	  a	  series	  of	  objects	  that	  are	  similar	  to	  one	  another,	  positioned	  extremely	  close	  to	  one	  another,	  and	  are	  oriented	  in	  a	  continuous	  fashion.	  Isn’t	  this	  exactly	  what	  we	  observe	  with	  supposed	  objects?	  All	  the	  pieces	  that	  compose	  a	  solid	  object	  seem	  to	  conform	  to	  these	  rules.	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Framed	  in	  terms	  of	  perception,	  this	  psychological	  approach	  to	  the	  special	  composition	  question	  should	  now	  make	  a	  lot	  more	  sense.	  But	  there	  are	  a	  few	  special	  cases	  that	  don’t	  quite	  have	  their	  answer	  yet.	  The	  first	  is	  this:	  what	  is	  the	  ontological	  status	  of	  some	  given	  x’s	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  observers?	  If	  there	  is	  no	  one	  observing	  the	  x’s	  (or	  more	  extremely,	  if	  there	  are	  no	  observers	  at	  all),	  then	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  evaluate	  the	  unity	  of	  those	  x’s,	  and	  they	  cannot	  be	  granted	  objecthood.	  In	  short,	  if	  there	  are	  no	  observers,	  then	  there	  are	  no	  composite	  objects.	  The	  other	  case	  I	  want	  to	  mention	  involves	  odd	  claims	  to	  objecthood	  that	  are	  not	  derived	  from	  evolutionary	  tendencies,	  nor	  from	  society.	  It	  is	  imaginable	  that	  someone	  could,	  through	  some	  mental	  effort,	  raise	  or	  lower	  their	  own	  threshold	  for	  objecthood,	  thus	  allowing	  them	  to	  consider	  incredibly	  disjointed	  arrangements	  as	  objects	  (as	  one	  might	  observe	  among	  philosophers).	  	  There	  is	  admittedly	  some	  question	  as	  to	  the	  validity	  of	  these	  “forced”	  claims	  that	  go	  against	  the	  ordinarily	  automatic	  process	  of	  perception.	  Perhaps	  some	  universalists	  would	  argue	  that	  this	  process	  allows	  unconventional	  composite	  objects	  with	  extremely	  low	  unity	  to	  exist.	  I’ll	  leave	  that	  as	  an	  open	  question	  for	  the	  time	  being.	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Chapter	  4:	  Objections	  and	  Clarifications	  
	  
1.	  How	  does	  universalism	  fit	  into	  this	  view?	  Is	  there	  a	  limit	  to	  what	  can	  be	  
considered	  an	  object?	  	   For	  any	  given	  x’s,	  there	  is	  at	  least	  some	  level	  of	  association	  between	  them.	  That	  association	  might	  be	  incredibly	  weak,	  but	  there	  is	  always	  some	  degree	  in	  which	  x’s	  can	  be	  considered	  together.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  we	  can	  imagine	  that	  for	  any	  x’s,	  there	  can	  possibly	  exist	  an	  observer	  with	  a	  low	  enough	  threshold	  that	  they	  would	  see	  those	  x’s	  as	  an	  object.	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  is	  technically	  true	  that	  any	  arrangement	  of	  x’s	  can	  be	  an	  object.	  	   With	  varying	  levels	  of	  unity,	  however,	  it	  seems	  as	  though	  some	  arrangements	  of	  x’s	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  composite	  objects	  than	  others.	  We	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  this	  in	  terms	  of	  “possible	  worlds”,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  relative	  proportion	  of	  people	  who	  are	  willing	  to	  assign	  objecthood	  to	  some	  given	  x’s.	  In	  our	  world,	  collections	  of	  animals	  (i.e.,	  flocks	  of	  birds,	  herds	  of	  cattle,	  schools	  of	  fish,	  etc.)	  are	  not	  generally	  seen	  as	  singular	  composite	  objects	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  we	  might	  view	  a	  chair	  or	  a	  table.	  But	  we	  can	  imagine	  a	  possible	  world	  where	  the	  typical	  person	  looks	  at	  a	  flock	  of	  birds	  and	  sees	  it	  as	  a	  single	  composite	  object	  flying	  in	  the	  sky,	  one	  that	  is	  just	  as	  much	  a	  single	  object	  as	  a	  wooden	  table.	  All	  that	  this	  change	  would	  require	  is	  a	  slight	  adjustment	  of	  the	  observer’s	  threshold	  for	  objecthood.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  might	  imagine	  a	  possible	  world	  where	  the	  typical	  person	  is	  compelled	  to	  say	  that	  there	  is	  an	  object	  composed	  of	  the	  upper	  half	  of	  every	  national	  monument	  (but	  not	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the	  lower	  half!)	  and	  the	  hair	  of	  every	  goat.	  Such	  an	  object	  would	  have	  a	  vastly	  lower	  level	  of	  unity	  than	  what	  would	  be	  generally	  acceptable	  in	  our	  world.	  We	  would	  say	  that	  the	  former	  possible	  world	  is	  “closer”	  to	  our	  own	  than	  the	  latter	  possible	  world.	  Furthermore,	  we	  would	  say	  that	  something	  with	  a	  high	  level	  of	  unity,	  such	  as	  an	  apple,	  is	  considered	  an	  object	  in	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  possible	  worlds	  than	  our	  patchwork	  of	  monuments	  and	  goat	  hairs.	  	  	   Going	  along	  with	  this	  idea,	  any	  given	  x’s	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  an	  object,	  and	  actually	  is	  one	  in	  some	  possible	  world.	  But	  in	  any	  of	  these	  possible	  worlds,	  the	  objects	  rely	  on	  appropriate	  observers,	  whose	  can	  regard	  the	  x’s	  in	  the	  way	  that	  the	  potential	  object	  requires.	  
	  
2.	  We	  can	  think	  of	  some	  ways	  that	  x’s	  can	  be	  associated	  that	  would	  not	  
increase	  unity,	  such	  as	  the	  association	  between	  cats	  and	  dogs	  or	  between	  salt	  
and	  pepper.	  How	  should	  we	  think	  of	  “association”?	  
	  	   Recall	  that	  back	  in	  chapter	  3,	  I	  previously	  referred	  to	  unity	  as	  “the	  degree	  of	  association	  among	  x’s”.	  This	  definition	  can	  be	  a	  bit	  troubling	  when	  we	  start	  to	  use	  the	  term	  association	  too	  liberally	  and	  misinterpret	  our	  definition.	  There	  are	  many	  associations	  that	  do	  not	  contribute	  to	  unity	  and	  can	  sometimes	  even	  detract	  from	  it.	  Consider	  the	  association	  between	  fire	  and	  ice.	  Yes,	  we	  might	  think	  of	  one	  in	  response	  to	  the	  other,	  but	  this	  type	  of	  association	  does	  not	  contribute	  positively	  towards	  unity.	  It	  comes	  about	  because	  of	  more	  complex	  notions	  we	  have	  developed.	  	   The	  key	  distinction	  about	  our	  definition	  is	  that	  we	  are	  not	  merely	  talking	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about	  association	  in	  general.	  We	  are	  looking	  at	  association	  among	  x’s.	  That	  is,	  associations	  between	  objective	  physical	  masses.	  These	  are	  the	  types	  of	  association	  that	  contribute	  positively	  to	  unity;	  ones	  that	  deal	  with	  bodies	  of	  matter.	  Sure,	  we	  might	  say	  there	  is	  some	  sort	  of	  linguistic	  association	  between	  an	  apple	  and	  an	  aardvark	  in	  that	  they	  start	  with	  the	  same	  letter	  in	  English,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  truly	  an	  association	  between	  an	  aardvark	  and	  an	  apple,	  but	  rather	  an	  association	  between	  two	  words.	  	   When	  we	  talk	  about	  opposites	  such	  as	  fire	  and	  ice,	  what	  we	  are	  actually	  associating	  are	  not	  x’s,	  but	  concepts	  of	  x’s.	  In	  a	  physical	  sense,	  there	  is	  relatively	  little	  unity	  between	  a	  flame	  and	  a	  chunk	  of	  ice.	  The	  same	  is	  true	  of	  the	  association	  between	  a	  baseball	  and	  a	  baseball	  bat.	  The	  two	  are	  associated,	  but	  this	  only	  seems	  to	  be	  true	  at	  a	  more	  conceptual	  level.	  I	  would	  consider	  these	  associations	  among	  ideas	  and	  concepts	  “second-­‐order	  associations”	  and	  they	  are	  not	  included	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  unity.	  	  
3.	  What	  constitutes	  an	  observer’s	  “threshold”	  for	  objecthood?	  And	  can	  an	  
observer	  alter	  their	  own	  threshold	  for	  objecthood?	  
	  	   When	  I	  discuss	  an	  observer’s	  “threshold”,	  I	  mean	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  various	  factors	  that	  set	  the	  bar	  for	  the	  observer’s	  subjective	  standards	  of	  objecthood.	  The	  factors	  can	  be	  quite	  numerous,	  and	  I	  do	  not	  claim	  to	  know	  of	  them	  all.	  In	  general,	  though,	  we	  might	  think	  of	  an	  individual’s	  threshold	  as	  being	  composed	  of	  their	  perception-­‐related	  genetic	  predispositions	  and	  societally-­‐
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instilled	  ways	  of	  thinking.	  	  	   Usually	  the	  object	  determination	  process	  is	  automatic,	  and	  involves	  very	  little	  personal	  input.	  But	  there	  are	  surely	  people	  we	  can	  think	  of	  who	  have	  bizarre	  ideas	  of	  what	  counts	  as	  an	  object,	  especially	  where	  philosophers	  are	  concerned.	  Part	  of	  how	  this	  might	  happen	  is	  through	  some	  sort	  of	  self-­‐conditioning.	  It	  is	  imaginable	  that,	  through	  repeated	  trial	  and	  error,	  you	  could	  train	  yourself	  to	  automatically	  identify	  a	  flock	  of	  birds	  as	  a	  single	  object.	  This	  would	  result	  in	  the	  observer	  immediately	  having	  the	  intuition	  of	  seeing	  an	  object	  when	  looking	  at	  a	  flock	  of	  birds.	  	  There	  is	  some	  question	  as	  to	  whether	  this	  is	  actually	  possible;	  perhaps	  the	  process	  works	  as	  normal	  and	  you	  have	  the	  intuition	  that	  the	  flock	  is	  not	  an	  object,	  but	  you	  feel	  like	  you	  can	  come	  up	  for	  an	  argument	  to	  explain	  why	  your	  intuitions	  are	  wrong.	  And	  perhaps	  this	  trial	  and	  error	  has	  not	  truly	  altered	  your	  threshold,	  but	  merely	  given	  you	  a	  conditioned	  response.	  If	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  alter	  one’s	  own	  threshold	  for	  objecthood,	  then	  we	  might	  need	  to	  raise	  further	  questions	  as	  to	  the	  validity	  of	  such	  objects.	  As	  it	  stands,	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  someone	  can	  directly	  tamper	  with	  their	  own	  object	  determination.	  
	  
4.	  Is	  there	  some	  objective	  sense	  in	  which	  unity,	  as	  a	  secondary	  property,	  is	  
grounded	  in	  matter?	  	  	   Insofar	  as	  they	  exist	  within	  the	  object,	  Locke	  says	  that	  secondary	  qualities	  are	  “nothing	  but	  powers	  to	  produce	  various	  sensations	  in	  us	  by	  their	  primary	  qualities”	  (Locke	  30).	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  secondary	  qualia	  come	  packaged	  inside	  the	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matter	  in	  some	  way;	  within	  the	  x’s	  there	  is	  an	  objective	  power	  to	  produce	  the	  sensation	  of	  a	  secondary	  quality	  in	  an	  observer.	  This	  power	  comes	  in	  the	  form	  of	  primary	  qualia	  that	  are	  associated	  with	  the	  secondary	  quality.	  If	  we	  want	  to	  give	  an	  objective	  account	  of	  “redness”,	  for	  example,	  we	  would	  want	  to	  reference	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  surface	  structure	  in	  the	  matter	  that,	  under	  the	  correct	  observation	  conditions,	  lends	  us	  the	  red	  sensation	  that	  we	  are	  familiar	  with	  in	  our	  experiences.	  That	  surface	  structure	  can	  be	  described	  in	  terms	  of	  primary	  qualities.	  The	  surface	  of	  a	  rose	  petal	  has	  the	  correct	  combination	  of	  solidity,	  texture,	  and	  motion	  of	  subatomic	  particles	  that	  provide	  the	  potential	  for	  the	  sensation	  ‘redness’	  when	  all	  the	  proper	  conditions	  are	  fulfilled	  (i.e.	  there	  is	  light	  interating	  with	  the	  petal	  and	  there	  is	  an	  observer	  present	  to	  receive	  the	  reflected	  light	  bouncing	  off	  the	  petal).	  This	  works	  the	  same	  way	  for	  unity;	  we	  can	  describe	  unity	  based	  on	  the	  primary	  qualities	  it	  uses	  in	  the	  x’s.	  Unity	  can	  consist	  of	  a	  vast	  variety	  of	  primary	  qualia;	  there	  are	  a	  myriad	  of	  ways	  x’s	  can	  be	  associated	  with	  one	  another.	  I	  won’t	  attempt	  to	  list	  them	  all.	  Instead	  I’ll	  highlight	  a	  few	  examples	  to	  illustrate	  how	  all	  of	  this	  is	  supposed	  to	  work.	  Consider	  an	  oak	  tree.	  An	  oak	  tree	  has	  a	  high	  level	  of	  unity,	  and	  most	  people	  should	  at	  least	  have	  the	  intuition	  that	  a	  tree	  is	  a	  unified	  entity	  (whether	  or	  not	  they	  are	  in	  favor	  of	  that	  intuition).	  Among	  the	  parts	  that	  compose	  this	  oak	  tree,	  there	  are	  primary	  qualities	  that	  are	  influential	  toward	  producing	  this	  unified	  sensation.	  The	  oak	  tree	  has	  a	  particular	  texture	  stretching	  across	  it,	  for	  example.	  All	  along	  its	  trunk	  is	  the	  same	  rough	  wooden	  texture	  of	  bark.	  Parts	  of	  the	  tree	  also	  have	  the	  right	  kind	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of	  motion	  that	  would	  lend	  unity;	  the	  heavy	  base	  is	  mostly	  immobile	  with	  gradual	  movement	  among	  branches	  the	  further	  they	  get	  from	  the	  base.	  These	  are	  all	  primary	  qualities	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  sensation	  of	  unity	  emanating	  from	  an	  oak	  tree.	  If	  we	  think	  of	  secondary	  qualities	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  object	  and	  its	  primary	  qualities,	  we	  can	  have	  the	  objective	  account	  we	  are	  looking	  for.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  secondary	  properties	  are	  reducible	  to	  primary	  qualities.	  	  
5.	  If	  unity	  can	  be	  objectively	  grounded	  in	  matter,	  then	  why	  do	  we	  even	  need	  to	  
reference	  observers	  in	  establishing	  objecthood?	  
	  	   When	  taking	  an	  objective	  approach,	  it’s	  true	  that	  we	  refer	  to	  unity	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  associated	  primary	  qualities.	  But	  this	  type	  of	  reference	  is	  done	  out	  of	  necessity;	  we	  do	  not	  have	  any	  other	  recourse	  when	  we	  remove	  observers	  from	  our	  discussion.	  Secondary	  qualities,	  such	  as	  unity,	  are	  not	  fully	  accounted	  for	  unless	  we	  reference	  the	  sensation	  that	  is	  had	  by	  an	  observer.	  Consider	  the	  color	  red.	  Redness,	  as	  we	  refer	  to	  it,	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  surface	  structure	  that	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  give	  observers	  the	  sensation	  of	  a	  particular	  color.	  The	  sensation	  aspect	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  meaningful	  part	  of	  what	  redness	  refers	  to;	  we	  often	  talk	  about	  redness	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  way	  our	  senses	  respond,	  such	  as	  with	  heat,	  passion,	  or	  anger.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  wouldn’t	  necessarily	  want	  to	  say	  redness	  is	  merely	  a	  sensation.	  Surely	  some	  aspect	  of	  redness	  is	  embedded	  in	  the	  objective	  world.	  Perhaps	  secondary	  qualities	  ought	  to	  be	  thought	  of	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  dyad	  between	  observer	  and	  observed;	  neither	  is	  sufficient	  by	  itself	  for	  instantiating	  the	  secondary	  property.	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   Even	  once	  we	  can	  determine	  the	  level	  of	  unity	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  x’s,	  this	  is	  still	  not	  quite	  enough	  to	  determine	  objecthood.	  X’s	  can	  only	  be	  seen	  together	  as	  an	  object	  if	  their	  unity	  is	  above	  a	  certain	  threshold	  of	  the	  observer.	  A	  higher	  level	  of	  unity	  is	  certainly	  more	  likely	  to	  imply	  objecthood,	  but	  by	  no	  means	  guarantees	  this	  status.	  	  
6.	  Can	  there	  be	  instances	  of	  composition	  that	  do	  not	  meet	  the	  observer’s	  
standards?	  And	  can	  x’s	  that	  do	  meet	  the	  standards	  fail	  to	  be	  an	  object?	  	  	   In	  making	  evaluations	  of	  objecthood,	  the	  observer	  automatically	  compares	  their	  own	  threshold	  for	  objecthood	  to	  the	  level	  of	  unity	  observed	  among	  x’s.	  In	  most	  circumstances,	  any	  x’s	  with	  a	  level	  of	  unity	  above	  this	  threshold	  will	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  composite	  object.	  This	  being	  said,	  however,	  it	  is	  not	  unimaginable	  that	  someone	  might	  view	  a	  lump	  of	  sand	  as	  an	  object,	  but	  not	  a	  table.	  Under	  what	  circumstances	  might	  someone	  fail	  to	  lend	  objecthood	  to	  x’s	  that	  successfully	  meet	  the	  threshold’s	  requirements?	  	   In	  order	  for	  such	  an	  oddity	  to	  be	  instantiated,	  an	  error	  would	  have	  to	  occur	  somewhere	  within	  this	  process.	  The	  most	  likely	  culprit	  is	  perception.	  If	  the	  observer’s	  perceptions	  fail	  to	  accurately	  reflect	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  x’s	  being	  observed,	  then	  the	  evaluation	  may	  result	  in	  objecthood	  when	  it	  should	  fail	  to	  do	  so,	  or	  vice	  versa.	  This	  type	  of	  perceptual	  error	  can	  be	  either	  internal	  or	  external	  to	  the	  observer.	  An	  external	  perceptual	  error	  would	  involve	  environmental	  conditions,	  such	  as	  fog	  or	  heat	  distortion,	  that	  give	  a	  false	  impression	  of	  the	  x’s	  being	  observed.	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If	  the	  perceptual	  error	  is	  internal,	  it	  is	  likely	  due	  to	  some	  issue	  with	  the	  observer’s	  senses,	  such	  as	  blurred	  vision,	  though	  this	  could	  also	  be	  due	  to	  an	  error	  in	  processing	  at	  some	  level.	  Any	  of	  these	  errors	  could	  result	  in	  inconsistencies	  in	  ascribing	  objecthood.	  	  
7.	  How	  does	  this	  view	  account	  for	  flawed	  perceptions?	  If	  I	  forget	  to	  wear	  my	  
glasses,	  my	  blurred	  vision	  might	  make	  me	  more	  likely	  to	  see	  a	  pile	  of	  garbage,	  
for	  example,	  as	  a	  single	  unified	  object.	  	  	   I	  understand	  the	  concern	  that	  is	  brought	  up	  here;	  we	  might	  think	  that	  if	  the	  observer’s	  perceptions	  are	  flawed,	  then	  any	  account	  of	  objecthood	  we	  might	  receive	  from	  that	  observer	  is	  compromised.	  Although	  this	  answer	  may	  run	  contrary	  to	  expectations,	  flawed	  perceptions	  do	  not	  invalidate	  object	  determination.	  Flawed	  perceptions	  can	  still	  produce	  valid	  assessments	  of	  objecthood.	  	   Think	  of	  the	  situation	  this	  way:	  an	  eagle’s	  eyesight	  is	  many	  times	  stronger	  than	  that	  of	  the	  normal	  human.	  It	  can	  identify	  miniscule	  animals	  to	  prey	  upon,	  even	  from	  high	  altitudes.	  When	  we	  consider	  this	  amazing	  feat	  of	  eyesight,	  we	  might	  say	  that	  the	  eyesight	  of	  any	  given	  human	  is	  deficient	  in	  comparison.	  We	  would	  not,	  however,	  want	  to	  invalidate	  the	  account	  of	  a	  human	  with	  20:20	  vision	  simply	  because	  they	  cannot	  compete	  with	  a	  bird	  of	  prey.	  	  	   If	  we	  are	  willing	  to	  allow	  for	  this	  level	  of	  imperfection	  among	  basic	  human	  senses,	  then	  perhaps	  we	  should	  also	  be	  willing	  to	  allow	  for	  more	  traditional	  flaws,	  such	  as	  blurry	  vision.	  In	  either	  case,	  there	  is	  simply	  an	  instance	  of	  less-­‐than-­‐perfect	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perception.	  	   It	  is	  also	  worth	  noting	  that	  decisions	  of	  object	  determination	  are	  not	  set	  in	  stone.	  If	  the	  individual	  with	  blurred	  vision	  later	  views	  the	  same	  x’s,	  he	  might,	  having	  acquired	  a	  pair	  of	  glasses,	  receive	  an	  entirely	  different	  impression.	  If	  this	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  case,	  the	  ontological	  status	  of	  the	  x’s	  may	  be	  updated	  for	  that	  observer	  as	  its	  circumstances	  change.	  	  
8.	  If	  John	  sees	  an	  apple	  as	  an	  object,	  but	  George	  does	  not,	  who	  is	  right?	  What	  is	  
the	  ontological	  status	  of	  some	  given	  x’s	  when	  there	  is	  conflict	  among	  
observers?	  	   First,	  I’ll	  clarify	  one	  point:	  there	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  unanimity	  among	  observers	  for	  some	  given	  x’s	  to	  count	  as	  a	  composite	  object.	  Objecthood	  is	  granted	  on	  a	  person-­‐by-­‐person	  basis	  in	  response	  to	  the	  observer’s	  particular	  threshold.	  The	  result	  is	  relativistic;	  if	  the	  unity	  of	  x’s	  is	  enough	  to	  pass	  the	  threshold,	  then	  the	  x’s	  are	  an	  object	  for	  that	  particular	  observer.	  	  To	  answer	  our	  question,	  both	  John	  and	  George	  are	  correct	  in	  their	  assessment.	  The	  apple	  is	  in	  fact	  an	  object	  to	  John.	  To	  George,	  there	  is	  no	  such	  object.	  In	  their	  disagreement,	  however,	  the	  two	  have	  made	  the	  error	  of	  assuming	  that	  the	  other	  shares	  the	  exact	  same	  standards	  of	  objecthood.	  This	  is	  an	  understandable	  mistake;	  most	  of	  the	  time	  humans,	  especially	  those	  raised	  under	  the	  same	  conditions,	  will	  be	  remarkably	  similar.	  Seeing	  others	  repeatedly	  share	  the	  same	  intuitions	  regarding	  given	  objects,	  we	  might	  come	  to	  assume	  that	  notions	  of	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objecthood	  are	  universal.	  But	  this	  assumption	  can	  be	  misleading.	  	  Is	  there	  a	  more	  general	  and	  objective	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  “is	  an	  apple	  an	  object?”.	  Unfortunately,	  no.	  We	  can	  speak	  of	  likelihoods	  for	  what	  most	  observers	  of	  a	  given	  kind	  will	  agree	  upon,	  but	  we	  can’t	  give	  an	  answer	  that	  will	  apply	  to	  any	  observer.	  If,	  however,	  you	  really	  want	  to	  know	  if	  there	  is	  an	  object	  composed	  of	  certain	  x’s,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  better	  authority	  on	  the	  matter	  than	  yourself.	  At	  a	  personal	  level,	  any	  observer	  should	  be	  able	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  “are	  there	  apples?”.	  	  
9.	  Can	  we	  speak	  of	  “collections”	  or	  “arrangements”	  of	  simples	  without	  reifying	  
them,	  counting	  them	  among	  objects?	  	  	  	   This	  is	  a	  point	  where	  language	  becomes	  tricky;	  in	  referring	  to	  x’s	  as	  collections	  or	  arrangements,	  there	  could	  possibly	  be	  an	  implication	  that	  these	  arrangements	  exist.	  Yet	  the	  words	  themselves	  are	  innocent	  enough.	  If	  we	  want	  to	  discuss	  some	  given	  x’s,	  those	  x’s	  will	  invariably	  be	  arranged	  in	  some	  way	  based	  on	  their	  position	  in	  space.	  Can	  we	  not	  call	  this	  an	  “arrangement”?	  And	  if	  we	  merely	  want	  to	  consider	  the	  group	  of	  x’s	  as	  a	  whole,	  is	  this	  not	  a	  “collection”?	  X’s	  do	  not	  just	  become	  objects	  the	  moment	  they	  are	  referenced	  together;	  there	  are	  other	  factors	  involved,	  such	  as	  the	  previously	  discussed	  unity	  and	  thresholds.	  I	  think	  the	  terms	  have	  their	  use	  when	  we	  are	  looking	  to	  refer	  to	  multiple	  x’s	  which	  are	  either	  presently	  ontological	  undetermined,	  or	  which	  have	  failed	  to	  meet	  the	  standards	  of	  objecthood.	  	  Having	  said	  all	  of	  this,	  I	  still	  take	  great	  caution	  in	  using	  the	  terms	  to	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10.	  Does	  objecthood	  require	  continuous	  observation?	  What	  happens	  to	  
previously	  confirmed	  composite	  objects	  once	  we	  stop	  observing	  them?	  
	   Once	  we	  have	  confirmed	  that	  some	  given	  x’s	  form	  an	  object,	  the	  observation	  of	  those	  x’s	  needs	  to	  be	  ongoing	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  status	  of	  an	  object.	  We	  can	  imagine	  a	  scenario	  where	  an	  observer	  judges	  some	  x’s	  to	  form	  a	  chair.	  Satisfied,	  our	  observer	  leaves	  the	  room	  and	  ceases	  observation	  of	  those	  x’s.	  In	  our	  observer’s	  absence,	  the	  chair	  collapses	  into	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  pile	  of	  saw	  dust	  that	  is	  then	  swept	  out	  the	  window	  and	  scattered.	  If	  we	  were	  to	  allow	  objecthood	  to	  persist	  among	  x’s	  without	  some	  ongoing	  observation,	  it	  could	  end	  up	  that	  the	  x’s	  cease	  to	  have	  their	  original	  degree	  of	  association,	  yet	  would	  still	  be	  called	  an	  object	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  observer.	  This	  is	  not	  the	  sort	  of	  claim	  that	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  make.	  But	  our	  judgements	  of	  objecthood	  do	  have	  a	  way	  of	  sticking	  around;	  they	  are	  not	  entirely	  trapped	  in	  the	  present.	  Upon	  viewing	  some	  x’s	  as	  an	  object,	  we	  “set	  the	  bar”,	  so	  to	  speak,	  for	  future	  encounters	  with	  that	  type	  of	  stimulus.	  Observing	  chair-­‐wise	  x’s	  and	  viewing	  them	  as	  an	  object	  will	  start	  to	  form	  an	  idea	  of	  “chairs-­‐in-­‐general”	  (a	  chair	  schema)	  in	  our	  minds.	  Given	  an	  idea	  of	  chair-­‐like	  stimuli	  that	  involves	  objecthood,	  we	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  make	  consistent	  judgements	  regarding	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  these	  stimuli;	  if	  in	  the	  past	  we	  assigned	  the	  label	  of	  an	  object,	  then	  we	  will	  likely	  do	  so	  again	  in	  the	  future.	  	  
	  
11.	  What	  about	  before	  observers	  existed?	  Before	  observers	  came	  into	  being,	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